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ABSTRACT 
Cross-Cultural Effects of Casualties on Foreign Policy Decision Making: South Korea 
and the United States. (August 2007) 
Nam Tae Park, B.S.; M.A., Republic of Korea Naval Academy 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
It is well accepted that casualties incurred as a result of interstate militarized 
disputes have a significant influence on domestic public opinion and ultimately on 
foreign policy decision making (FPDM).  Although scholars have studied the influence 
of casualties on FPDM, the major line of research ignores the possibility that different 
cultural settings may generate different levels of tolerance for human casualties and 
thereby differentially mediate public reactions. Therefore, I attempt to clarify the impact 
of cultural factors on interpretation and perception of human casualties in international 
conflicts by the general public and their implications on consequent foreign policy 
choices. 
I specifically examine two socio-cultural factors in the context of two culturally 
different states, South Korea and the United States.  The two cultural factors are (1) the 
level of individualism vs. collectivism, and (2) the degree of ambiguity intolerance.  I 
argue that the two factors will possibly affect the public’s tolerance of human casualties. 
I expect that they will affect both the process by which members of the two cultures 
make decisions and their choices. Cross-national experimental design (in South Korea 
and the United States) and a comparative case study were employed. 
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Regarding the decision choice, I found that the expected number of casualties 
were considered in different ways by American students and Korean students. Different 
from my expectation, the Korean students perceived the expected number of casualties 
more negatively than the American students. With regard to the process of decision 
making, the empirical results support the hypotheses that the different levels of 
intolerance of ambiguity, a cultural factor, will have an impact on the decision process. 
Specifically, Korean students, who are less tolerant of ambiguity, needed less 
information to reach a final decision than did American students.  
Overall, although the results did not completely support cultural accounts, 
cultural explanation has been proven to be a viable ingredient in explaining the different 
observed patterns of foreign policy decision making. Specifically, a cultural factor, 
ambiguity intolerance, had an impact on the process rather than the choice.  In addition, 
this study presents some theoretical implications as well as political implications. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well accepted that casualties incurred as a result of interstate militarized 
disputes have a significant influence on domestic public opinion and ultimately on 
foreign policy decision making.  Therefore, whenever politicians consider the use of 
force, they should take into account the possible number of casualties and try to 
minimize the risks.  The following newspaper article provides a good example of how 
expected casualties are considered in making decisions on the use of force. The account 
refers to the intense debate between officials of the Defense and State departments in the 
administration over planned military intervention in Haiti to remove its military leader 
from power, to stop the killing of innocent Haitians, and, finally, to restore democracy in 
Haiti.  
Defense Secretary William J. Perry proposed to grant amnesty to 
members of the military junta in Haiti and induce them to leave for 
comfortable lives in exile. But Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott, who has emerged as the State Department’s chief policy 
maker on Haiti, argued that offering incentives was morally 
repugnant. In a sharp exchange, Mr. Perry countered instead that 
Mr. Talbott represented a strange morality: He argued that it would 
be immoral for the United States not to do whatever it could to 
avoid the deaths of American soldiers (New York Times August 4, 
1994).  
 
As a matter of fact, President Clinton granted amnesty to the Haitian military 
junta for the atrocities committed against numerous innocent Haitians, by allowing junta 
This dissertation follows the style of The American Political Science Review. 
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members to depart to Panama to live comfortable lives. This action was taken purely for 
the sake of saving American soldiers’ lives during the invasion by diffusing the hostility 
of the Haitian armed forces.  
Regarding the significance of the impact of the number of casualties on public 
support and policy making, some argue for the importance of the non-compensatory role 
of casualties (Luttwak 1995,1996), others contend that the public’s tolerance of 
casualties depends on the objectives of the military intervention (Jentleson 1992; 
Jentleson and Britton 1998).  Generally, casualties have been treated in various ways: 
casualties as a cost (Bennett and Stam 1996; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995), as a 
representation of the intensity of militarized conflicts, and as a criterion for the success 
or failure of conflicts. These approaches are similar in that they have treated all types of 
casualties in the same way. In contrast, some studies have indicated that not all kinds of 
casualties have the same impact (Mueller 1973, 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; 
Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997).  For instance, Mueller (2004) argues that the 
causes of the deaths contribute to differences in perception of the significance of 
casualties.  
However, this line of research ignores the possibility that different cultural 
settings may generate different levels of tolerance for human casualties and thereby 
produce different public reactions.1  I doubt that all societies perceive the costs of 
casualties in the same way. For instance, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s statement 
                                                 
1 The importance of casualties has been described in several ways: some present it as “sensitivity of 
casualties” while others uses “tolerance of casualties” (see Gelpi et al. 2005). In this study, I employ both 
terms.    
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that he was “prepared to sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers in return for the last grain 
of the holy heart of Sinai”2 would not be easily accepted in Western democracies.  This 
statement may imply that different cultures put distinct values on human casualties, and 
consequently, the public within these societies may have differing levels of tolerance for 
casualties. Therefore, I will attempt to clarify the impact of cultural factors on the 
interpretation and perception of human casualties in international conflicts and their 
implications for foreign policy choices. 
Some political scientists have been quite vocal in insisting on the significance of 
cultural factors (e.g., Almond and Verba’s 1963 Civic Culture). Yet, overall, 
international relations (IR) scholars have generally overlooked the role of culture in their 
interpretation of international behavior for the last several decades, especially during the 
Cold War (Hudson 1997).  As a result, culture has not yet been specifically defined in a 
manner similar to systemic variables, which work relatively well in explaining a state’s 
behavior. In contrast to political science, cultural approaches to human behavior have 
been used more extensively in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. 
In the literature on foreign policy decision making, Vertzberger (1990: 267-270) 
argues that culture, as “a unified set of ideas” among the members of a nation, has a 
strong influence on shaping “the decision maker’s style of thinking, mode of judgment, 
and attitude toward information.”  Based on this argument, cultural factors are expected 
to have substantial impact on foreign policy decision making because they affect 
                                                 
2 http://www.zionet.co.il/manhigut/en/view_article.php3?article_id=85) 
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perception, interpretation, and reaction to situations and information.  Specifically, I 
want to unveil how cultural values influence decision processes as well as outcomes in 
foreign policy decision making.  
To accomplish this, I examined two socio-cultural factors within the context of 
two culturally different states, South Korea and the United States.  The two cultural 
factors are (1) the level of collectivism vs. individualism, and (2) the degree of 
ambiguity intolerance.  I proposed that the two factors could possibly affect the level of 
public tolerance of human casualties. I expected that they would affect both the process 
by which the members of each culture made decisions as well as their actual choice.  In 
particular, collectivism pertaining to the group’s goals and interests was expected to lead 
the public to perceive casualties less negatively, making it more likely that they would 
choose to send troops to take part in an armed conflict. Conversely, individualism should 
cause the individual members of the public to focus on their own interests, leading 
people to take a more negative view of casualties. Therefore, I expected that collectivism 
and individualism would highly influence the decision choice.  Similarly, ambiguity 
intolerance, an epistemic factor, was also expected to have an impact on the process of 
decision making because it was expected to cause decision makers to hasten to their final 
decision.  
Simply, the general questions addressed in this dissertation are the following:  
♦ Do the number of casualties have a different impact on foreign policy decision 
making in different cultures?  
Specifically, regarding the decision outcomes, is the impact of the number of 
casualties on the choice different between South Koreans and Americans ? 
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♦ Concerning the decision process, what is the impact of the number of casualties 
on how the choice is derived? Further, does the impact of casualties on the 
decision-making process differ between South Koreans and Americans? 
 
Overview of the Research Project 
 
The Cognitive Calculus decision model (CC model) will be employed to analyze 
the impact of cultural ingredients on foreign policy decision making (Geva, Mayhar and 
Redd 1997). The CC model is an online decision model with decision thresholds that are 
associated with a binary choice (to do or not do). A threshold (TH) is where the decision 
process stops and a choice is determined. The moves towards the TH represent changes 
in the Cumulative Choice Propensity (CCP), which are affected by the valence of the 
items, the relevance, and reliability of the information.  Most prominently, the CC model 
has room for a framework of the specific effects of culture as part of its Implicit Theory 
of International Relations, which describes “the stored knowledge and beliefs” any 
decision maker possesses with regard to international events (Geva et al 2000:452). 
     
Method  
 
Cross-national experimental designs (in South Korea and the United States) and a 
comparative case study were used. Many political scientists assert that the experimental 
method is the most scientific approach (Lijphart 1971). This is because experiments 
contribute to the identification of clear and unambiguous causal relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables by controlling other factors that might 
otherwise affect the dependent variable (Mook 1982; Collier 1993; Lijphart 1975; 
McDermott 2002).  
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However, other scholars are pessimistic about experimental designs based on 
perceived problems of external validity, defined as the generalizability of results, due to 
an experiment’s artificiality (Danilovic 2003).  In order to address concerns about the 
artificiality of experimental research, a detailed examination of historical cases can be a 
useful complementary method. Comparative case studies will be provided in order to 
corroborate the findings from the experiments and increase their generalizability. These 
cases highlight considerations of potential casualties by both South Korea and the United 
States.   
In the two experiments, participants had to make foreign policy decisions in the 
context of either an international humanitarian crisis or a direct threat to national security. 
Both types of situations carried a risk of casualties. The design varied the number of 
expected casualties, as well as the underlying dimensions of the conflict. The 
experiments were conducted using South Korean undergraduate students and military 
officers and Texas A&M University undergraduate students as subjects.  
 
Contributions   
 
 This dissertation makes several contributions within foreign policy decision 
making (FPDM). First and most significantly, the results of this study add to the 
clarification of the effects of number of casualties on foreign policy decision making 
through the lens of culture.  Although the effects of casualties on FPDM have been 
delineated in various ways, such effects rarely employed the cultural difference as an 
alternative explanatory variable. Hence, this research will advance the existing literature 
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on casualties. Second, the neglect of a systematic approach toward the study of socio-
cultural impact on foreign policy decision making (FPDM) has been a virtual Achilles’ 
heel within cultural studies.   Hence, this research, which entails a more systematic 
approach along with empirical evidence, will contribute to the methodological 
development of the examination of cultural influences on FPDM.   Moreover, 
comparison of the experimental results across nations will add to the generalizability of 
the findings as well as to the underlying conceptualization.  
There is also a substantive practical contribution made by this study. Most 
studies with regard to casualties have been centered on American casualties, their impact 
on the U.S. public, and their influence on the U.S. FPDM process. Thus, studies on other 
countries’ casualties and their impact on foreign politics are rare. However, there are 
some practical reasons for examining the influence of other countries’ perceptions of 
casualties. This is especially true for the U.S. given its preference for coalition warfare. 
For example, the G.W. Bush administration attempted to form a multi-national force to 
implement its war against Iraq. Although the U.S. requested that its allies send military 
forces to Iraq, only some joined the effort.  If the U.S. had recognized the importance of 
its allies’ perception of casualties, perhaps it would have been more successful in 
persuading them to join. This research describes differing considerations of casualties, 
then proposes a few practical implications for U.S. FPDM.  
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Organization of Dissertation 
 
Chapter I introduces the issues and the research questions, as well as the 
purposes and an overview of the research design. In addition, I assert that the research 
will help to strengthen the understanding of the cross-cultural impacts of casualties on 
foreign policy decision making and advance the field of casualty studies.  
The extant literature on this research is presented in chapter II. In this review, I 
concentrate on the topics of casualties and culture.  The state of knowledge is examined 
in the following: various approaches of the effects of casualties in IR; casualties and 
their effect on public reactions; culture as a variable in IR and FPDM and the effects of 
culture on the parameters of process and choice.   
Chapter III addresses the conceptual model of the dissertation, the general 
propositions, hypotheses to be tested, and the method employed.  In order to develop the 
propositions, two different cultural factors are used, collectivism vs. individualism and 
ambiguity intolerance.  I employ the Cognitive Calculus decision model that is geared to 
measuring both choice and the process, the two principal components in decision making.  
Experiments are used as the major method to test the hypotheses. 
In chapter IV, I present the empirical results of two questionnaires designed to 
measure the difference between Korean subjects and American subjects along two 
cultural dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance.  
In chapter V, I address the results and analysis of experiment 1, where the 
context is a hypothetical international humanitarian crisis. Participants are asked to read 
the humanitarian scenario, review some associated information, and finally make a 
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decision. The analysis will first compare American students and Korean students. Then a 
report comparing the Korean students and Korean military officers is presented.  
The results and analysis of experiment 2 are illustrated in chapter VI. In contrast 
to experiment 1, experiment 2 is developed using a fictitious international crisis 
associated with security concerns, specifically terrorist bombings.  The presentation of 
the results from experiment 2 will follow the pattern of chapter V.  
In chapter VII, I provide a comparative case study that serves to corroborate the 
findings of the two experiments. The results of the two experiments indicate that Korean 
participants are more sensitive to casualties than are Americans. In this case study, I 
want to clarify whether or not Koreans are more sensitive than Americans to casualties 
incurred during international military interventions. In order to do this, it is necessary to 
choose two cases that contain the risk of casualties or casualties and the public’s 
reactions to them from America and South Korea, respectively.  
In chapter VIII, the conclusion, I review the impact of differing perceptions of 
casualties on foreign policy decision making.  I present a summary of the methods 
(experiments and a comparative case study) employed in this study.  I also present a 
synopsis of the findings from chapters IV, V, VI, and VII.  I conclude with a few 
theoretical and political implications and suggestions, as well as an outline for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, I address the relevant literature for this research and by focusing 
on exiting bodies of research in terms of casualties, discover a neglected aspect of the 
study.  The two principal topics of the literature are covered: casualties and culture in 
International Relations literature.   
The studies on casualties are divided into two main areas. The first part of the 
literature review will present works in which the effects of casualties on public support 
and foreign policy decision making are examined. I also present a competing view of the 
public’s sensitivity to casualties and conditions in which the public becomes tolerant (or 
intolerant) to casualties.  As for culture, I present the literature and arguments as 
accepted in the field of political science and use culture as a variable in IR and foreign 
policy decision making, looking at the effects of culture on the parameters of process 
and choice.   
 
Impacts of Casualties on Public Support and FPDM 
 
Casualties have been treated in various ways in International Relations to help 
explain the intensity of militarized conflicts. The more casualties a conflict generates, 
the more severe the conflict is considered to be (Jones et al.1996).  Moreover, casualties 
are considered an important factor in the evaluation of a nation’s success or failure in 
conflicts. A relatively large number of casualties is viewed as a failure in a military 
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conflict, whereas a comparatively small number of causalities is viewed as a success. In 
the context of decision making, with the rational choice perspective, casualties are 
viewed as a factor of cost when a political leader decides whether or not to initiate a war 
(Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995). 
Scholars seem to reach a consensus on the rational cost-benefits, or “ends-
means” calculus of casualties (Richman 1995).  In utility calculation, costs are divided 
into direct and indirect. Direct costs explicitly focus on decision makers and their 
choices. For instance, decision makers are not likely to choose an option that is expected 
to generate many casualties. On the other hand, indirect cost refers to the impact of 
casualties on public support that, in turn, has an impact on a political decision maker’s 
choices. Decision makers’ choice preference is linked to their responsiveness to public 
opinion and public support for maintaining a particular course of political action (Mintz 
and Geva 1997). Accordingly, if the use of force is expected to yield casualties, it 
undermines public support. Consequently, political decision makers in such 
circumstances would not opt for the choice involving the use of force.  In other words, if 
the popularity of the government is expected to dwindle “in proportion to the war’s cost 
in blood and money” (Russett 1990: 40), the option of using force would decrease 
accordingly.   
Nincic and Nincic (1995) also view casualties as a cost by using an economic 
metaphor. The authors argue that once the initial decision to employ military 
intervention has been made, the government’s commitment to the intervention will be 
determined by “(a) its perception of the intervention’s toll, and (b) the extent of 
  
12
 
continued public support for its policy.” (Nincic and Nincic 1995: 414).  However, they 
conceptualize the costs from the standpoint of two actors: the government, as the source 
of actual foreign policy decisions, and the public expecting their preferences to be 
incorporated into the government’s decision-making policy.  Although the two parties 
have a common view on casualties as a cost, they have a fundamentally different 
conceptualization of the dead: the public perceives casualties as consumers while 
governments regard them as an investment. Consumers expect a simultaneous return for 
their costs, whereas investors, who look for future benefits, do not. According to this 
analogy, when costs, military casualties, begin to go beyond expectations, a government, 
as an investor, is more likely to remain committed to his military intervention.  On the 
other hand, public support should decrease as the costs, i.e., casualties, go up.  
In addition, there are some studies which attempt to present the impact of 
casualties in different contexts, such as the temporal effects (i.e., at the early stage of war 
or at a later period of a conflict) (Mueller 1973), through the pattern of accumulation of 
casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Seguar, and Wilkening 1997), or the 
cause of death (Mueller 2004). 
To explore this idea further, Mueller (1973), for instance, argues that the 
relationship between mounting casualties and dropping public support is “not a linear 
manner with an increase from 100 to 1000 being the same as one from 10,000 to 10,900” 
(Mueller 1973: 60).  A small number of casualties in the early stage of a conflict have a 
significant impact on public opinion. In other words, as the conflict continues, a 
relatively large number of casualties have less impact on public support because the 
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public becomes “hardened to the wars’ costs” (Mueller 1973: 62). Thus, as a war 
continues, the public becomes habituated to casualties, and the public’s reaction to 
casualties is not as firm as it was in the early stages of the war.  This indicates that the 
public’s sensitivity to casualties would weaken as time goes on.  Hence, this study 
contends that casualties do not always affect public support in the same way. 
Gartner and Segura (1998), studying the Vietnam War and the Korean War, 
focus on the effective patterns of the accumulation of casualties.  They categorize two 
patterns of casualties -- cumulative and marginal.  Cumulative casualties are the total 
number of casualties in a certain conflict, while marginal casualties indicate the rate of 
increase or decrease of casualties.  The cumulative number of casualties should be an 
appropriate predictor of public support when most of the casualties in a conflict occur at 
the early stage, and the rate of casualties remains the same or decreases.  This was the 
case in the Korean War.  On the other hand, as in the Vietnam War, when casualties are 
proportionally distributed over the course of the conflict, marginal casualties are the 
most plausible indicator of the level of support for the conflict. 
 Mueller (2004), in the context of terrorism, emphasizes specific conditions in 
which casualties occur. Casualties resulting from terrorists’ attacks have a greater impact 
than those coming from war and militarized disputes.  He contends that although the 
number of casualties from terrorists attacks is far smaller than those from car accidents, 
the reaction to these casualties is “hasty, ill considered, and over-wrought” because of 
extensive fear and anxiety over terror (Muller 2004:1). Consequently, the impact of 
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casualties stemming from terrorist attacks is more significant than that of casualties 
inflicted by militarized conflicts.  
 
Conditions That Cause the Public to Be More Tolerant to Casualties  
 
There are competing views on the public’s sensitivity to casualties: some contend 
that the public is casualty phobic (Luttwak 1995; Luttwak 1996), others argue for the 
public’s rational approach to casualties (Nincic and Nincic 1995; Jentleson 1992; Gelpi 
et al. 2005, 2007; Richman 1994; Larson 1996; Mueller 2000).  Yet the scope of 
sensitivity is somewhat diverse: ranging from the minimally sensitive to extremely 
sensitive.  For those who recognize causalities as a necessary cost of war, sensitivity 
depends on the context such as objectives or whether or not national interests are at 
stake. Those scholars who view the public as a rational actor recognize casualties as a 
cost on the rational cost-benefit model or ends-means calculus to determine sensitivity.   
On the other hand, the latter asserts that casualties are a non-compensatory rule that 
requires virtually no casualties in shaping support for military intervention. 
Consequently, potential casualties are a major stumbling block when politicians are 
considering use of military force.  
However, most scholars seem to reach a consensus over the rational approach of 
the public’s sensitivity to casualties (Nincic and Nincic 1995; Larson 1996; Jentleson 
1992, 1998; Muller 2000; Gelpi et al. 2005; Hyde 2000; Kull and Ramsy 2001). Based 
on this logic, those scholars have concentrated on the conditions which serve to facilitate 
the public’s tolerance over casualties.  
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Jentleson (1992) proposes “the principal policy objective theory” (PPO) on 
which  the public bases its casualty tolerance (Jentleson 1992: 49).  He categorizes types 
of military intervention into foreign policy restraint (FPR) and internal political change 
(IPC). The FPR focuses on the state that implements aggressive foreign policies against 
the United States (i.e. Iraq in 1990, when President Hussein invaded Iraq).  The IPC 
concentrates on regime changes that threaten U.S. interests (i.e. the U.S. invasion of 
Panama in 1989 during Reagan’s presidency).  He contends that the public will accept 
missions with PPOs focused on what he calls FPR goals as important missions that are 
worth a substantial cost. Consistent with the study (Jentleson 1992), Jentleson and 
Britton (1998) add another category of military intervention, humanitarian intervention 
(HI). They assert that the U.S. public will support HI only if the costs are relatively low.   
Larson (1996) provides four elements that are expected to have an impact on the 
public’s casualty tolerance: the perceived benefits, the prospects for success, the costs, 
and consensus support (or its absence) from political leaders. Specifically, he defines 
consensus as congressional support. He emphasizes the significant role of consensus or 
its absence among political leaders that influence the shaping of the public’s attitude 
toward military intervention.  
Mueller (2000) focuses on a different factor than other studies. The author 
stresses the role of morality on the public’s casualty tolerance. He stresses the 
importance of the role of benefits resulting from military intervention on the public’s 
casualty acceptance because the public perceives so little benefit in most military 
intervention.  He argues that the best defense against dropping public support resulting 
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from casualties is “popular conviction of their compelling moral value.” (Mueller 
2000:16).    
Gelpi et al. (2005, 2006) argue that the public’s tolerance for casualties is a 
matter of certain circumstances. According to their theory, they attempt to find some 
conditions with which the public becomes tolerant to human costs--casualties.  Mounting 
casualties have not always produced a reduction in public support.  For example, the 
U.S. public’s tolerance is shaped by the interaction of two crucial attitudes: “beliefs 
about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and the belief about a war’s likely success.” 
(Gelpi et al 2005:8). The likelihood of success matters most in determining the public’s 
willingness to tolerate deaths of U.S. soldiers.  
Moskos’ (1996) approach to the public’s casualty tolerance is somewhat unique 
because he proposes an institutional factor--drafted armed forces.  He argues that it is not 
demographics or a heroic cause that affects the level of the U.S. public’s tolerance over 
casualties, but rather it is the problem of who is willing to die for the cause. He proposed 
that Americans accepted the 291,557 battle deaths during WWII because of the elite 
youths in the military. However, Americans would not be as tolerant as they were then in 
the current volunteer military. Consequently, Americans’ tolerance of casualties would 
be increased only “if their leadership and national elites were viewed as self-
sacrificing.”(Moskos 1996:12).   
These studies suggest that casualties do not always affect the public’s support for 
foreign policies in the same way. Furthermore, these findings suggest that the impact of 
casualties have multiple roles to play in decision making and policy preferences of 
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leaders and the public. Therefore, drawing from the relevant elements of the previous 
findings, my inquiry revolves around the question “Do casualties have the same impact 
on people who live in culturally different societies?”   
 
Culture in Political Science 
 
In the discipline of political science in general, cultural accounts have been 
addressed and treated as an alternative to the rational and institutional perspective.  
Although some scholars agree that cultural and institutional approaches comprise 
distinct explanations of variations of political behavior,3 some argue the superiority of 
cultural accounts, while others contend for the outstanding nature of the institutional 
view. I present the competing views between cultural and institutional approaches 
mainly in the study of political and economic development.   
The cultural approach in political science has been traced back to Weber in the 
early twentieth century.  He argued that the propensity of the Protestant ethic contributed 
critically to the prosperity of western capitalism (Weber 1905).  Almond and Verba’s 
(1963) Civic Culture is considered the benchmark of the application of the cultural 
account to political behavior. Specifically, they contend that civic culture causes 
variations by examining the results in developing democracies among five different 
societies. In line with this, Putnam and Inglehart are popular scholars who supported 
cultural accounts in the1990s.  
                                                 
3 See Jackman and Miller (2005) p.30.  
  
18
 
Putnam (2000), in his bestselling book Bowling Alone, explaines that the rate of 
civil engagement in American society has plummeted and examines its negative impact 
on American political behavior, specifically political participation. This reduction of 
social capital can be seen in the declining rates of active organizational involvement, 
church membership, and even family dinners. The author attributes this dwindling to 
longer commutes and an upsurge in the amount of time spent watching television. 
Overall, Putnam attempts to explain Americans, alteration of political trends using the 
cultural factor civic engagement.  
On the other hand, Jackman and Miller (2005), in the book Before Norms: 
Institutions and Civic Culture, argue that the institutional approach outperforms cultural 
accounts in explaining variations of political behavior. An underlying premise of the 
institutional view is that people seek to optimize their benefits from all available options, 
which is the assumption of the rational choice perspective.  Thus, alterations of 
institutions that lead to change in constraints and incentives cause changed political 
behavior.  
In the discipline of political economy, cultural accounts have been applied to 
explain economic development.  Inglehart’s (1990, 1997) attempts to apply a cultural 
approach to economic development offer a new explanatory power in dealing the diverse 
levels of economical development.  Specifically, there is a large body of studies which 
delineates the key factors that distinguish the economic success of many east Asian 
countries from the cultural perspective. Among them,  Hofstede and Bond (1998) and 
Hicks and Redding (1983) argue for the significant role of a cultural asset, labeled 
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Confucian values,  in explaining the rapid industrialization of eastern Asia.  Hofstede 
and Bond (1998) developed a questionnaire to measure Confucian values in eastern 
cultures that are associated with remarkable economic advancement. 
In contrast, North (1990:3-4) defined institutions as “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” and emphasized the significant role of 
institutions in economic performance.  In line with this, although Wade (2003) and 
Amsden (1989) do not ignore the role of cultural factors in accounting for the impressive 
economic development in east Asian countries, they place more weight on the role of 
central government than on the function of cultural inheritance in these countries. They 
assert that an export-oriented industrial strategy, led by a central government, has been 
the key ingredient for the economic success in east Asian countries.  
As I address the competing approaches between cultural and institutional 
accounts regarding the impact of casualties (i.e. Moskos 1996), this study tests the 
applicability of the cultural explanation in perceiving casualties.  
 
Culture as a Variable in IR and FPDM 
 
The cultural study in IR is an area that has not been fully explored and is quite 
underemphasized. A majority of scholars have asserted that culture in IR is not an 
attractive explanation for various phenomena. Other schools of thought, however, have 
been quite vocal in insisting on the significance of cultural factors. Yet, overall, IR 
scholars have generally overlooked the role of culture in their interpretation of 
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international behavior for the last several decades, especially during the Cold War 
(Hudson 1997).  
There are several compelling reasons why cultural accounts have not been 
persuasive in IR studies. First, systemic ingredients had been dominant in explaining 
international events  during that period (Galenslen 1986).  Distribution of power in the 
system, introduced by Waltz (1979), has been the most popular source of explanation for 
several decades.   The second problem for the infrequent use of cultural accounts is 
rather endogenous.  Culture has been considered one of the mega-concepts in social 
science, in line with market, class, and power (Pye 1991). However, it often has been 
used as a last resort when facing a lack of alternatives to account for variances (Verba 
1965). Correspondingly, the cultural approach has been most significantly criticized for 
non-specific and inconsistent definitions and conceptualization (Geertz 1973).  This 
drawback of the cultural aspect makes it less suitable for present day methodological 
standardization and the behavioral evolution of social science.  
Some scholars have been active in using cultural variables in their research since 
the 1960s and 1970s in spite of the shortcomings of the cultural approach. However, it is 
obvious that the present revival of the cultural view is largely due to the recent upheavals 
in the world’s political arenas (Gaenslen 1997).  The death of communism and end of 
the Cold War are the most prominent reasons that encourage scholars to draw on cultural 
factors and incorporate them into their studies.  
Richardson’s study (1960) of the impact of cultural similarity on conflict is a 
seminal work in the cultural perspective. He examines whether or not cultural similarity 
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and dissimilarity, represented by language and religion, affects the probability of war by 
exploring 300 wars from 1820 to 1949. In contrast to other findings, he concludes that a 
significant relationship exists between culture and international war.  Cottam’s (1977) 
findings are consistent with Richardson’s (1960) argument.  In his book, Foreign Policy 
Motivation, he argues that “perception of cultural distance” is one of the significant 
determinants of “worldview” (315). In other words, the differences between one’s own 
culture and that of the other nation are factors that affect the development of images of 
other countries (Herrmann et al. 1997), and which drives decision makers into 
cooperation or conflict. Henderson’s two studies (1997, 1998) are also consistent with 
these results. Henderson (1997) argues that cultural factors have a significant impact on 
initiating war even when geographical contiguity is controlled. Specifically, the most 
risky dyads are “religiously dissimilar, territorially contiguous, and ethnically similar 
pairs of states” (Henderson 1997: 666).  This finding is confirmed by the research that 
examined democratic dyads (Henderson 1998). Henderson concludes that religious 
similarities have a positive effect on democratic peace, whereas ethnic and linguistic 
likeness has a negative impact on democratic peace.  
Within this perspective, Huntington has recently been the most vocal supporter 
of the cultural approach.  Huntington (1993), in his study Clash of Civilizations, suggests 
that the fundamental source of conflict after the Cold War era will not be ideology or 
economy but culture. During the Cold War, this source of conflict was kept in check, but 
in the post-Cold War era, it will be unleashed. Furthermore, he asserts that “the fault line 
between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (1993: 22). Therefore, 
  
22
 
Huntington predicts that future conflict between civilizations will replace ideological 
and other forms of conflict as the principal form of conflict in international relations.  
As for the cultural approaches to foreign policy decision analysis, it is the least 
developed subfield of IR literature (Hudson 1997). In contrast to political science, 
cultural accounts of human behavior have been explored relatively more intensively in 
anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. In support of the cultural claim in the 
literature on foreign policy decision making, Vertzberger (1990: 267-270) argues that 
culture, as “a unified set of ideas” among the members of the nations, has a strong 
influence on shaping “the decision maker’s style of thinking, mode of judgments, and 
attitude toward information.”  Furthermore, he argues that rationality can be interpreted 
differently in different cultural settings. Evaluations of similar behavior, objects, and 
events could have different values and judgments in different cultures that form a unique 
belief system and values.  In similar vein, a study by Geva and Hanson (1999) suggests 
that socio-cultural similarity of a given target nation vis-à-vis the United States has an 
impact on the perception of its regime; and is related to the choice of policy against that 
target.  
 “Cultural schema,” by Hershberg (1993), is an attempt to connect culture with 
the cognitive approach. He argues that the cognitive approach in IR is the most adequate 
one in understanding international behavior during the Cold War because the stimulus-
response paradigm does not correlate with the fact that different people generate 
different answers even when given the same stimulus.  Specifically, he introduces the 
“cultural schema theory,” which combines culture and the concept of schema in social 
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psychology. Schema is defined as a particular cognitive pattern that simplifies the world 
to make it comprehensible (25). It structures behavior as well as perception.  Culture, 
defined as a shared set of beliefs in the society, consists of commonly shared schemata 
(30). Individuals who live in the society learn to adopt schemata that are common in 
their culture. Consequently, the predominance of those schemata yields particular social 
behaviors. The Cold War schema, for example, helped to unveil the complex but 
consistent patterns of U.S. foreign policy behavior.   
The literature thus suggests that culture has not been frequently used as an 
explanatory variable because it has not yet been specifically defined in contrast to other 
systemic variables, which worked relatively well.  On the other hand, some attempt has 
been made to advance an understanding of the impact of culture on conflictual and 
cooperative behaviors as well as on foreign policy decision making.  In this study, I will 
try to clarify the impact of culture on foreign policy decision making. Specifically, I 
want to unveil how cultural values influence the structures, processes, and outcome of 
foreign policy decision making.  
 
Effects of Cultural Dimensions on Foreign Policy Decisions 
 
I chose to use cultural ingredients, which were coined by Hofstede (1997; 2001). 
He identifies "four main dimensions along which dominant value systems in the forty 
countries can be ordered and which affect human thinking, organization, and institutions 
in predictable ways" (Hofstede 1980:11). These cultural indexes are: power distance, 
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uncertainty avoidance,4 individualism vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs femininity.5  
He developed a questionnaire to measure the different levels of these four cultural 
indexes among IBM works in fifty different states.   
These indexes are popular in cross-cultural studies across academic disciplines. 
For example, Zurovchak (1997), employs these four indexes to examine the different 
types of foreign policy decision making between Czechs and Slovaks. On the other hand, 
Huh (2002), in the thesis for his theological masters degree, uses these four indexes to 
distinguish leadership values of Korean missionaries in the Philippines.  
However, I use only two indexes among the four: individualism vs. collectivism 
(INCOL) and ambiguity intolerance (AI). When I chose cultural variables for this 
research, the guidelines that Galenslen (1986) suggests were useful.  The author states 
that cultural explanations which depend on similarities in a particular society may also 
provide a good explanation for the differences between a society and other societies 
(Galenslen 1986:80).  Using this logic, among the four cultural indexes, I chose two 
which assume the most extreme and diametrically opposite values for Korean society on 
the one hand, and for American society on the other.   Additionally, there should be the 
least conceptual distance as possible between cultural variables and what one hopes to 
interpret by them (Galenslen 1986:82).  In other words, if I want to show the different 
levels of tolerance of casualties, the cultural variables, here INCOL and AI, are as 
                                                 
4 Hereafter, I replace uncertainty avoidance with ambiguity intolerance. The two concepts are ultimately 
same, but I want to use one terminology throughout this dissertation.  
5 Power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Masculinity and 
femininity are defined as “masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distant 
from each other and femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap.” (Hofsete 1997: 
25, 80). 
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conceptually close to the interpretation and perception for casualties as possible.  To be 
specific, the implications of INCOL and AI have to have reasonable connections to the 
interpretation and perception of human casualties.   
 
Definitions of the Two Cultural Indexes 
 
Individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance are the most 
appropriate indexes for this study because Koreans and Americans are significantly 
different in the two indexes (Hofstede 1997).  
Individualism and collectivism are defined as follows (Hofstede 1997: 51): 
Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: 
everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.  
Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are 
integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout a person’s lifetime continue 
to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
The essential concept that split individualism and collectivism is how personal 
self is defined. An independent self-construct associated with individualism is defined as  
“bounded, unitary, and stable” that is different from others (Singelis 1994: 580).   When 
thinking about themselves, individuals tend to refer to their own “preferences, abilities, 
attributes, characteristics, or goals rather than referring to the thoughts, feelings, or 
actions of others” (Singelis 1994: 581).  They build up self-esteem through expressing 
and endorsing their own attributes. Regarding communication, they are more likely to 
express themselves directly.   
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On the other hand, people who have an interdependent self-construct that 
pertains to collectivism view themselves as a part of a group. They do not think of 
themselves and others as separate but intertwined. They gain self-esteem when they are 
involved in harmonious interpersonal relationships and are capable of adjusting 
themselves to the group in which they are involved. Hence, they tend to pay attention to 
others’ thoughts, actions, even unexpressed intentions. As for communicating with 
others, they opt for the use of an indirect manner (Singelis 1994: 581). 
Some argue that individualism has been incorporated into the cultures of most 
northern and western regions of Europe and North America, whereas collectivism has 
been associated with Asia, Africa, South America, and the Pacific Islands (Tridandis 
1988; Markus & Kitayama 1991).  The principal quality of individualism is placing 
priority on personal goals over in-groups goals, whereas collectivism puts weight on 
“subordinating personal goals to those of the in-group” (Trandis 1988). In other words, a 
collectivistic society is one in which the interest of the group prevails over the interest of 
the individual, while the interest of the individual predominates over the interest of the 
group in an individualistic society (Hofstede 1997:50). As to an individuals’ 
identification, collectivists emphasize that human beings cannot be self-identifying, but 
must be identified as part of the larger group such as the family and state.  Thus, an 
individuals’ sacrifice would be valuable if done for the sake of the group, such as for a 
country.  In an individualistic society, individuals try to identify himself or herself based 
on “I” rather than “we.” They also prioritize their personal goals, interests and values 
over the society to which they belong (Triandis 1995; Oyserman at al., 2002).   In 
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accordance with the above propensities of individualism and collectivism, Table 2-1 
presents some comparisons of the two implications in decision making.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AI is defined as "the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel 
different from usual." (Hofstede 2001: xx). In other words, it is a measure of the level of 
discomfort with "ambiguity, nonconformity, and uncertainty within a society." 
Table 2-1 The Implications of INCOL for Decision Making  
Individualism  Collectivism  
1. Decision procedures, group 
composition, and forum of decision 
making are often left to chance.  
2. Task prevails over relationship 
3. Advancement is supposed to be based 
on skills and performance. 
4. Conflict is resolved through 
competitions and or majority rule since 
group harmony is not a priority 
5. Superior/subordinate relations are 
based on mutual advantage.  
1. Much attention is given to design 
procedures, composition of decision 
making group, and forum of decision 
making. 
2. Relationship prevails over task. 
3. Advancement takes groups obligations 
into account. 
4. Conflict is resolved through 
negotiation and/or bargaining since 
group harmony is a high priority. 
5. Superior/subordinate relations are 
family like and include protection and 
loyalty.  
Source: Zurovchak (1997) p.130.  
 
Table 2-2 The Implications of AI for Decision Making  
Low Ambiguity Intolerance  High Ambiguity Intolerance  
1. Few and general rules and SOPs 
characterize organization.   
1.Authority is vested in rules and SOPs 
that are many and precise throughout the 
organization. 
Source: Zurovchak (1997) p.135.  
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(Zurovchak 1997:133).  In the context of decision making, there are two contrasting 
implications of AI. One is that people with a high level of AI tend to seek more 
information en route to a final choice so as to minimize the uncertainty involved in their 
decision (Hofstede 1997). In compliance with the quality of AI raised by Hofstede 
(2001), the implications of AI on decision making are listed in Table 2-2.  
An alternative line of thought suggests that people with a high level of AI are less 
likely to need information en route to a final choice (Kruglanski and Ajzen 1983).  
According to the authors, in the epistemic perspective, human beings need to have a 
structure, which is knowledge on a given topic, in order to understand something as well 
as to minimize ambiguity. If one is less likely to tolerate ambiguity, the need for 
structure would be heightened. It would then intensify the person’s tendency to stick to 
existing and early information and knowledge, consequently, one is not open to 
accepting and using new information.  In the decision-making context, we assume that 
decision makers high in AI are likely to seek quick closure and to require less 
information to make a decision and thereby minimize ambiguity.  
I argue that these two cultural factors, the different levels of INCOL and the 
different levels of AI, influence the levels of tolerance for human casualties in different 
cultures. Using this argument, I developed a model to portray how those cultural 
ingredients affect the foreign policy decision-making process and outcome. 
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CHAPTER III 
 THEORY, MODEL AND METHOD 
 
This chapter addresses the conceptual model and the general propositions of the 
dissertation, the hypotheses to be tested and the method employed.  In order to develop 
the propositions, I use two differing cultural factors, collectivism vs. individualism and 
ambiguity intolerance, and compare results from the United States and South Korea. For 
this research, I employ the Cognitive Calculus (CC) decision model, which is geared to 
measure both choice and process, which are the two principal components in decision 
making.  Experiments are used as the major method to test the hypotheses. 
 
What Is the Cognitive Calculus Model? 
 
As I noted above, the CC model is an attempt to bridge the gap between choice 
and process in decision making in order to overcome the lack of outcome validity in the 
cognitive decision approach (Geva and Skorick 1999; Geva, Mayhar and Redd 1997; 
Geva, Mayhar and Skorick 2000; Geva et al. 2003a). The fundamental premise of this 
model is that "an individual is the engine that conducts the decision-making process" 
(Geva and Skorick 1997:448). Thus, the model, an on-line process model, attempts to 
portray how decision makers implement their decision calculus, and show their 
capabilities in processing, integrating, evaluating, and interacting with many pieces of 
information, both coming from outside sources and previously existing in the decision 
maker's mind.  Figure 3-1 presents overall description of the CC model.  
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The Information Context  
In order to evaluate and grasp the core of information coming from diverse 
sources, four criteria are used: valence, relevancy, reliability and redundancy. These 
factors have an impact on the cognitive/computational process of decision making.  
The information valence of an item is defined as "the implication an item has for 
moving choice propensity toward one of the two options" (Geva et al. 2003b:6). 
Reliability indicates a decision maker's confidence with the accuracy of incoming 
information. The relevance of the item reflects "the correlation between the dimension 
underlying the item, and the dimension underlying the decision maker's choice 
propensity" (Geva et al. 2003b:6).  Redundancy can be defined as "the common variance 
between or among cues, or simply as information inter-correlation." (Geva et al. 2003b: 
6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Cognitive Calculus Decision Model
A situation 
Or 
A crisis
Four Criteria
- Valence
- Relevance
- Reliability
- Redundancy
I T I R
Perception and Interpretation 
of Coming Information
Making a Decision
A Information item
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The Implicit Theory of International Relations (ITIR) 
 
The concept of Implicit Theory of International Relations (ITIR) is introduced 
when a decision maker translates incoming information into the above mentioned 
parameters of valence, relevancy, reliability, and redundancy. It indicates that any 
decision maker holds a “stored knowledge and beliefs” with regard to international 
events (Geva et al 2000:452).   The CC model assumes that there is continuous 
interaction between incoming information and the ITIR, and this interaction is expressed 
in terms of: valence, relevancy, reliability and redundancy.  
In line with this notion, Taber (1992:80) argues that “any decision maker’s belief 
system will contain beliefs about ‘how the world works’ in certain contexts.”  This 
knowledge base contains perceived or believed relations that exist between or among 
concepts that describe the international arena. For instance, an individual’s ITIR may 
contain the belief that the world will be peaceful or stable if democratic states dominate 
the world system or if communist states like North Korea were to eventually fail. Thus, 
ITIR is similar to other conceptualizations suggested previously in the study of foreign 
policy decision making: international belief system (Taber 1992), operational codes 
(George 1969; Walker 1977, 1983), images (Herrmann et al. 1997), and cognitive maps 
(Axelrod 1976; Young 1996).  
The principal function of ITIR is to interact with incoming information and 
consequently affect the interpretation or perception of the information. This interaction 
would happen constantly during the decision process. It conforms with the proposition of 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) that the beliefs of political decision makers wield 
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influence on the interpretation and perception of international situations and these are 
reflected in a state’s actions. In addition, ITIR is considered to be an integral source for 
defining the relevance of incoming information and its correlation to other information 
acquired in the process. Furthermore, belief about the source of information and the 
compatibility of its valence with previously acquired knowledge may translate into a 
decision-maker’s confidence in an item’s reliability (Geva et al., 2000).   
The concept and function of ITIR is the main reason that I use the CC model to 
clarify the impact of culture on perception of casualties. Vertzberber (1990:267) defines 
culture as “a unified set of ideas” that is developed within a set of shared “premises, 
values, expectations, and action predispositions” among the members of the nations. 
Based on this definition, culture has a strong influence on shaping “the decision maker’s 
style of thinking, mode of judgments, and attitude toward information” (Vertzberber 
1990: 270). Corresponding to Vertzberber’s argument about culture, the CC model, 
particularly the concept of ITIR, has room for reflecting the impact of culture on the 
perception and interpretation of casualties in the process of decision making.  
In this research, the two different cultural groups, represented by the United 
States and South Korea, have differing patterns of perceiving and interpreting casualties 
incurred in a foreign military intervention. Such shared ideas about casualties in the two 
cultural groups could reside as stored knowledge and beliefs within the ITIR. Hence, 
when an individual encounters an item of information associated with casualties, 
previously existing and shared ideas about casualties could wield influence over the 
perception and interpretation of the information, leading eventually to a final decision.  
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The Computational Mechanism 
Differing from Milton Lodge’s online process model (Lodge 1995; Lodge et al. 
1989), the CC model describes a threshold (TH) where the online process stops and the 
choice is made.  As pieces of incoming information are integrated into the Cumulative 
Choice Propensity counter, the decision maker quits processing information and makes a 
final choice when the choice propensity passes the decision threshold or there is no more 
information available.  This threshold is not fixed, but can be altered based on certain 
conditions. Factors that affect the location of the threshold (stringent or lenient) are “the 
importance of the decision” and “the decision style of the decision maker” (Geva et al., 
2000:453). For instance, emotional stimulations would lower the threshold and cause 
decision makers to be quicker in reaching their final choice.  
In addition, Geva and colleagues (Geva et al. 2000) contend that most choices are 
dichotomous, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive, i.e., the choice between doing (a) and 
not doing (~a). For example, these two choices may consist of sending forces or not 
sending forces or implementing economic sanctions or not implementing economic 
sanctions in handling international crises.  
Because the CC model seeks to capture the choice and process components of 
decision making, I employ the CC model in my research for finding the differing impact 
of casualties on foreign policy decision making in both America and South Korea. In 
addition, the CC model can accommodate a framework for specific effects of culture as 
part of its ITIR.  
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General Propositions 
 
I extracted six propositions that relate to how the two cultural variables influence 
the public's perception and interpretation of casualties within the framework of the CC 
model.  
It is a generally accepted proposition that human lives are an individual’s 
possession. Casualties cost the life of individual human beings and the public recognizes 
military deaths as valuable ones.  Casualties in this research result from interstate 
military conflicts such as war, military intervention, etc. Thus, all of these military 
operations are supposed to have certain causes as typically claimed by a nation’s leading 
politicians.  Further, it is typical for people to show respect or give honor to the military 
casualties of those who pursued national goals. In most cases, national goals during 
interstate militarized conflicts involve national security.  
The propensities of individualism and collectivism lead to different 
interpretations and evaluations of casualties in a conflict. The literature posits that 
collectivists are more likely to place greater emphasis on group interests rather than 
individual ones, while individualists place more weight on the benefits and interests of 
the person rather than on the interests of the group to which they belong.  
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that public reaction to casualties is divided 
between those who follow collectivism versus those who follow an individualistic 
orientation. When perceiving casualties, people in collectivistic societies would place 
more weight on the national goals associated with military conflicts where the soldiers 
were killed than on the casualties themselves.  In contrast, an individualistic public 
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places more saliency on casualties, a personal belonging, than on the goals for which 
they died.  Therefore, when processing information about a conflict, I expect that human 
casualties may draw less consideration in a collectivistic society than in an 
individualistic society. Using the CC terminology, two propositions follow:  
Proposition 1  
The society that follows collectivism (COL) views casualties as less 
relevant or important than those who follow individualism (IN).  
 
Proposition 2 
The society that follows collectivism (COL) puts less negative valence 
(value) on casualties than those who follow individualism (IN).  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are two opposite views concerning the ambiguity 
intolerance: (1) ambiguity intolerance raises the decision threshold; (2) ambiguity 
intolerance lowers the decision threshold. These two interpretations have a direct effect 
on information processing since lowering and raising the decision threshold influences 
the number of items a person will acquire prior to stopping the decision process.  
On the basis of Hofstede’s interpretation (Hofstede 1997), if the decision maker 
is more likely to avoid ambiguity, he/she will tend to acquire more information before 
reaching a final choice. Hence, the threshold tends to be higher in this case. Accordingly, 
a decision maker in a society with a relatively low level of ambiguity intolerance will 
tend to reach a final decision with less information and, thus, the decision threshold will 
be lower.   
The alternative proposition is based on Kruglanski and Ajzen’s (1983) notion 
that high ambiguity intolerance requires less information and demands that decision 
makers arrive at closure sooner because ambiguity intolerance requires a structure in 
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order to comprehend the situation and information, thus intensifying the tendency to 
adhere to current and early information.  Therefore, a decision maker who has high 
ambiguity intolerance is more likely to have a lower decision threshold and need less 
information. Based on the two competing theories about the impact of ambiguity 
intolerance, I propose the two following contending propositions: 
Proposition 3a 
A public that exhibits a high degree of ambiguity intolerance (wants to 
minimize ambiguity in the decision) will have a higher threshold of the 
decision, and thus they will need more information before reaching a final 
choice. 
 
Proposition 3b 
A public that exhibits a high degree of ambiguity intolerance will have a 
lower decision threshold, and thus will need less information en route to 
the final choice. 
 
In addition to the above propositions that deal with the effects of the cultural 
dimensions on process and choice, I include a proposition that is derived directly from the 
CC model and is explored in this study in conjunction with the cultural factor. This 
proposition addresses the effects of variations in the saliency of the choice to the decision 
makers. Specifically, it is posited that the more salient the decision, and the more 
“urgent” the solution, the lower the decision threshold will be, causing less information to  
be required prior to making a choice.  
Proposition 4  
An increase in the salience of the decision to the respondents will decrease 
the length of the decision process (in time and number of items acquired), 
and it may increase attention to the information that has been acquired. 
 
Finally, based on the literature that considers casualties associated with a military 
intervention as a cost and the findings that states are ready to incur more costs for goals 
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that are more important to them (Hensel and Diehl 1994; Bennett 1998), it is reasonable 
to propose the following: 
Proposition 5 
An increase in the number of expected casualties in a military intervention 
will reduce the public’s support for that intervention.  
 
These propositions lead to the following hypotheses that are tested in this study. 
 
Hypotheses  
 
This section proposes hypotheses to be analyzed, as well as outlines the two 
experiments used as tools for testing them. The hypotheses are designed to test the 
differences between American and Korean participants with regard to their choices and 
their decision processes. The two experimental designs are developed in the contexts of 
a humanitarian scenario and security scenario.   
By adapting the CC model, I argue in the proposition that individualism vs. 
collectivism will have an impact on the decision through both relevance (weight) and 
valence (value) attributed to the information on the expected casualties. The different 
levels of ambiguity intolerance will have an impact on the process through the leniency 
of the threshold. Likewise, increasing the salience of the objective makes things more 
important, but also more urgent, which results in a lower threshold and a quicker 
decision.  
Based on the propositions outlined earlier and the specific layout of the 
experiment, the following general set of hypotheses can be derived. These hypotheses 
separately address the choices people make and the processes they use in making their 
decision.  
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Hypotheses about Choice 
 
These hypotheses mainly focus on the expected effect of the collectivism vs. 
individualism dimension (expressed in the cultural difference between Korea and the 
United States) on the valence and relevance of the casualty information provided during 
the experiment.  
Collectivists are more likely to put greater emphasis on group interests as 
opposed to individual ones. In contrast, people who live in a more individualistic society 
place greater weight on the benefits and interests of the person rather than on the group. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that expected human casualties may draw less consideration 
in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society. Hence, I contend that 
Koreans, as compared to Americans, would have a greater tolerance for expected 
casualties when deciding the use of force in military foreign policy. 
Ha1: Koreans will be more supportive of a military deployment than will 
Americans. (Based on propositions 1, 2 and 5)  
 
Ha2 addresses the effect of salience on support for the use of force. The 
hypothesis reflects the expectation that states are ready to incur more costs for goals that 
are more important to them (Hensel and Diehl 1994; Bennett 1998). Thus, I hypothesize 
that the public will more strongly support the use of force as a function of the salience of 
the objective, especially when the salience is manipulated in the relevance of the victims 
to the respondents.  
Ha2: Higher saliency of the crisis will increase public support for 
deployment of the military. (Proposition 5) 
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The next hypothesis addresses the expected interaction of culture and casualties. 
If valence and relevance of casualties are affected by collectivism or individualism, and 
if as stated in proposition 2, the number of casualties is less important in the Korean 
culture, then I can expect an interaction between the two societies and the number of 
casualties. Americans, having lower levels of collectivism, but higher levels of 
individualism, place more weight on individual cost rather than cost to the group in 
comparison to Koreans. Therefore, it is expected that Americans will put more relevance 
(weight) and valence (value) on the expected casualties associated with policy choices. 
In conclusion, a change in expected casualties should have a more negative impact on 
the support for use of force for Americans than for Koreans. 
Ha3: The negative impact of higher numbers of casualties on support for 
the use of force is expected to be stronger for American subjects than for 
Korean subjects.  
  
Hypotheses Concerning the Process 
 
These hypotheses focus on the expected effects of the ambiguity intolerance 
dimension that distinguishes between the decision processes of the two nations. This 
cultural dimension is expected to influence the process mainly through relocating the 
decision threshold.  
The effect of ambiguity intolerance on the decision-making process will be 
identified by measuring the number of items needed by the subjects to reach final 
decision, the recall of these the items, and time spent on items. I have already discussed 
the two competing expectations concerning the effects of the ambiguity intolerance on 
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the decision threshold. Based on the two different views of ambiguity intolerance, I 
hereby present both hypotheses. 
Hb1a [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a stringent threshold]: 
Relative to Americans, Koreans are more likely to review more items, will 
recall more items, and spend more time on items, en route to their final 
decisions. 
 
Hb1b [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a lenient threshold]: 
Relative to Koreans, Americans are more likely to review more items, will 
recall more items, and spend more time on items, en route to their final 
decisions. 
 
The next hypothesis concerns the effect of issue salience involved in the crisis on 
the three dependent measures. It focuses on a factor that has been shown to affect the 
threshold (Bragg and Geva 2004) and is used in part to validate the experimental 
procedure, as well as to increase the construct validity of the previous hypothesis.  
Hb2: Saliency of the decision will decrease the time spent on the decision 
(urgency) while increasing attention to the items that have been reviewed 
(higher recall). (Proposition 4) 
 
Method 
 
The major empirical thrust of this dissertation rests on the experimental method. 
Although the experimental design has been criticized as lacking external validity, some 
scientists praise the strength of this particular method (Lijphart 1971). The experimental 
design can better illustrate clear and unambiguous causal relationships between the 
dependent variable and independent variables by controlling other factors that may 
affect the dependent variable (Mook 1982; Collier 1993; Lijphart 1975; McDermott 
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2004).6  The next section describes the basic context of the experiment designs and how 
they relate to the hypotheses to be tested.  
 
The General Experimental Contexts  
 
 Participants from both societies were asked to make a decision about whether or 
not to deploy their military forces to a particular international crisis, based on a given 
scenario and information set that is provided to help them make the choice.  To make it 
relevant to both societies (especially to Korea), the policy was defined as a deployment 
of military units as part of a multi-lateral U.N. sponsored or approved international force.  
As part of the conceptualization, I posited that the objective of intervention may 
be a factor in the decision process. Hence, depending on the experiment, humanitarian as 
well as national security objectives were presented.7  These were realistic objectives 
based on previous U.N. interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia. National security is a 
critical ingredient for the level of tolerance of casualties (Larson 1996). Therefore, 
exploring the two different interests in separate experimental settings (a humanitarian 
crisis or a security issue) should have enhanced the robustness of the findings of this 
study.  Because while the different objectives of intervention affect the importance of the 
decision, I also introduced the factor of salience within each experiment to see how it 
would mediate the perception of casualties and affect both process and choice.  
                                                 
6 Although experiment is a good approach to control environmental factors, there are certainly limitations 
to such control for experimenters. This is because prior experiences, beliefs, expectations, and the skills of 
the participants may affect the results of experiments.  The random assignment of subjects to experimental 
conditions is the conventional method of dealing with these (and other) individual differences (McDermott 
2002).  
7 See the experiment scenarios in chapters V and VI. 
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The information sets that were used to make the decision were based on previous 
information sets used by Geva (2006).8  Immediately after reviewing the scenario, 
including the saliency manipulation, participants were given the option of seeing as 
many additional information items as they wanted to help them in making their choice.  
The information sets included variations in the number of casualties that were expected 
in the operation, which was one of the main independent variables in the study.   
 
The Experimental Designs 
 
The translation or specification of the theory to an empirical investigation was 
implemented via computer-based experiments. The study employed two sets of 3х2х2 
between-groups factorial designs. The three factors were the level of expected casualties 
(low-medium-high), the salience of the objective (low-high), and the cultural identity of 
the participants (Americans and Koreans).  The main dependent measures were the 
participants’ support of a use of force policy in a hypothetical conflict and the process 
parameters. The more detailed descriptions of the experiments are presented in the 
following sections.  Figure 3-2 is the outline of experimental design.  
 
Participants 
 
Each information set was administered to a different group of participants. The 
three groups were composed of Americans students, South Korean students, and 
members of the Korean military.  The American participants consisted of two hundred 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 1 for the information set.  
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and fifty undergraduate students attending Texas A&M University. They were recruited 
from introductory political science courses.  
There were two Korean groups, the first included three hundred and twenty 
undergraduate students at universities in the three major cities of Korea-- Seoul, Pusan, 
and Kwangjoo. The second Korean group was composed of two hundred and thirteen 
military officers at Korean National Defense University in Seoul. The military officers 
were all in the masters degree program and were between 25 and 35 years old.  
There is no claim that the samples of the study are fully representative of the two 
societies. While the Korean students were recruited from several universities in three 
different cities, the American students reflect one location, which is typically considered 
more conservative than other student bodies. It may be argued that a more diversified 
sample of American students would produce different findings. However, it should also 
be noted that in terms of the cultural variables that are expected to differentiate between 
Americans and Koreans, my findings show that the two samples are different in the 
predicted direction.9  Furthermore, along Mook’s (1983) argument on the deductive 
underpinning of experiment, if the theory is valid, then its derivatives should be 
expressed in the two specific samples provided that the experiments reflect appropriately 
the key concepts of the theory.  
I administered the experiments in September 2006 with the Korean subjects and 
in October 2006 with the American subjects. Noting the temporal context of the 
administration especially for American subjects is important.  Terrorists attacks of 
                                                 
9 While this argument does not fully discount effects of political ideology (e.g. conservatism) on foreign 
policy preferences, the main focus of this study is on the effects of culture.  
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September 11, 2001, and the ongoing war in Iraq could affect the perception of expected 
casualties when conducting the experiments with American subjects. Specifically, the 
number of American soldiers killed in the ongoing war was approximately three 
thousand when the experiments were conducted.  Hence, the American participants may 
have had different expectations concerning fatalities than their Korean counterparts.  
Participants in each group were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions.  
 
Procedure 
 
The experiments were administered through an online-based decision program, 
the Dec-Tracer.10  Participants were seated in front of computers connected to Dec-
Tracer through the Internet.  Using Dec-Tracer, participants were presented with 
scenarios introduced to tasks, and asked to make a foreign policy.  The program 
recorded not only each subjects’ final choice but also their overall decision process e.g., 
time spent and the information reviewed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The Dec-Tracer program was developed by Uri Geva and Infinity Design.  
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The experiments proceeded in four basic steps.11  First, participants read the 
basic instructions, which reviewed the overall procedure of the experiment.  Then, the 
subjects were exposed to the scenarios, either experiment 1 involving the humanitarian 
scenario or experiment 2 introducing the security scenario.  In both experiments, 
participants were asked whether they supported or rejected deployment of military units 
of their country as part of a U.N. multilateral force to resolve a crisis. During the second 
phase, additional information about the crisis was provided. Participants could make 
                                                 
11 Prior to conduct each experiment, participants were asked to read a consent form approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of Texas A&M University. 
Figure3-2: Overall Experimental Design
EXP I:
Humanitarian issue
EXP II:
Security issue
Salience
- Low Salience
-High Salience
Casualty levels
- Low
- Medium
- High
Manipulated Variables
FINAL CHOICE
American subjects
American subjects
Korean subjects
Korean subjects
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their choice and stop reviewing information at any time.  The subjects were also asked to 
indicate how confident they were of the selection they had made.   
Third, after the selection of a policy option, participants were provided with a list 
of countries and asked to list their capitals. This exercise helped to “remove” 
information from the participants’ short-term memory. Following this distraction the 
participants were asked to recall the information from the scenario they had read.  
Finally, the experiments ended with questionnaires designed to assess individualism vs. 
collectivism (Singelis 1994), ambiguity intolerance (Budner 1962), helping to confirm 
the relationship between the assumed cultural difference of the countries and the actual 
cultural beliefs of the two samples of participants.12 Figure 3-3 shows the flow of the 
procedure of the experiments.  
 
Experiment 1: Humanitarian Issue 
 
Experiment 1 focused on a humanitarian issue: the hypothetical scenario 
described a case where the members of the American and Korean Red Cross participate 
in a humanitarian response in an African country whose citizens are suffering from a 
relentless civil war. The situation in this country is exacerbating regional tensions, 
therefore the U.N. Security Council decides to send a U.N. peacekeeping force to stop 
the killing of civilians and enforce a peace agreement. The scenario is based on the 
current Dafur crisis in Sudan where the militia (admittedly supported by the Sudanese 
government) has attacked civilians and killed over 300,000.   
                                                 
12 See Appendix 2 for the questionnaires.  
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Figure 3-3: Procedure of the Experiments
Step 1: INTRODUCTION/SCENARIO
Initial Experimental Instructions: Experimenter 
explains topic of experiment and role subjects are to 
play. Subjects read informed consent forms. 
Participants seat themselves at a computer, then 
randomly assigned to one of six experimental 
conditions. Then, they start to read the scenarios by 
using Dec-tracer program. 
Step 2: CHECK INFORMATION/MAKING DECISION
Participants could access information when clicking information button in 
the screen until information sets run out of items or choose a policy option. 
Participants would select a policy option either sending troops or not sending 
troops. option. 
Item #1: 
Item #2: 
Item #3: 
Step 3: RECALL THE INFORMATION
Participants are asked to recall what they read when clicking  
information  sets.
Step 4: POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE
Participants are given three questionnaire: collectivism (12questions), 
individualism(12 questions), and ambiguity intolerance(18 questions).
Item #20: 
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The research design represents two contexts that differ along the two cultural 
dimensions (individualism vs. collectivism and ambiguity intolerance), the number of 
expected casualties (low, medium, high), and the salience of the objective (low- high). 
The dependent variables of the experiment included process parameters of decision 
making (number of items used, recall of items, and time spent on items) and the final 
choice itself (to send forces or not to send forces). Figure 3-4 presents the overall 
scheme of the experiment.  
The highly salient case would be threats to the Red Cross members from the 
participants’ own country, while a low-salience case would be threats to the Red Cross 
members from a different country. In other words, a highly salient case for American 
participants would be when members of the American Red Cross are in danger.  A low- 
salience case for American participants would be when Korean Red Cross members are 
threatened by rebel forces.  
 
Figure 3-4: Experiment 1 Humanitarian Issue 
 
 
 
 
The saliency manipulation in this scenario is introduced in the following form.  
 
 
 
American participants 
 
 Low casualties   Medium casualties    High 
casualties 
Low 
salience 
A B C 
High 
salience 
D E F 
 
 
 
Korean participants 
 
 Low casualties   Medium casualties   High 
casualties 
Low 
salience 
G H I 
High 
salience 
J K L 
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After reading the scenarios, participants could view as many items as they 
wanted to see. The first item they reviewed was related to the expected number of 
casualties, which were broken into three variations of the expected number of casualties: 
5, 50, and 200. Taking into consideration the number of troops that would be deployed, a 
regiment of 1,000 soldiers, I regarded 5 as respectively “low casualties,” 50 as “medium 
casualties,” and 200 as “high casualties.”  
 
Experiment 2: Security Issue 
 
Experiment 2 was basically a conceptual replication of the first experiment, but it 
moved the decision task from a humanitarian context to a security one.  I expected that 
the two different contexts would result in differing perceptions of casualties. 
Additionally, Americans and Koreans were expected to differ in their interpretation of 
expected casualties within the security context.  
In this second experiment, the hypothetical scenario stated that the U.N. Security 
Council had approved the use of force to remove the ground forces of a “target nation” 
that had invaded a neighboring country. The invading country had also been supportive 
of international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, this country had been accused of 
supporting the terrorist bombing that killed Americans or Koreans in the area.  
The saliency manipulation in this scenario was introduced in the following form.  
The highly salient case was expected to be a terrorist attack on citizens of each of the 
participants’ own countries, while a low-salience case would be a terrorist attack on 
citizens from another country.   In other words, a highly salient case for American 
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participants would be a terrorist attack on Americans. An example of a low salient case 
for American participants would be a terrorist attack on Koreans. The variations of the 
expected number of casualties in the military operations are 5, 50, and 200. The other 
items in the information set were also adapted to the new scenario.  The same 
independent variables of experiment 1 were employed in the factorial design (3х2х2). 
Furthermore, a similar set of hypotheses was tested using the same dependent measures.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 CULTURAL DIFFERENCE - AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
 
This chapter presents empirical evidence that American students and Korean 
participants differ along the two cultural dimensions: collectivism vs. individualism and 
ambiguity intolerance.  
 
Cultural Difference between American Students and Korean Subjects 
 
Previous literature in cross-national studies by anthropologists and sociologists 
have asserted (and sometimes demonstrated) that Americans and Koreans are different 
along cultural dimensions (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Hofstede 2001). Thus, American 
participants are expected to be different from the Korean participants along the two 
cultural dimensions of collectivism vs. individualism, and ambiguity intolerance. To test 
this assumption I used scales that were employed in previous studies to illustrate 
differences between these two groups (Singelis 1994; Budner 1962).  
For collectivism vs. individualism, I used a version of a scale developed by 
Singelis (1994) (see Appendix 2).  The significant element in this scale is that it is based 
on the notion that individuals can be high or low on both dimensions of collectivism and 
individualism (that they are not just opposite poles of a continuum). Based on this idea, 
this scale has two sub-scales for each of the two dimensions: collectivism and 
individualism. Singles (1994) initially developed the scale for use with students as 
subjects. Thus, it is suitable for this research that employs students as subjects in both 
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Korea and America.  Also, the scale I used focuses on the individual’s preferences. In 
this regard, the author culled items from various previously developed scales, then 
rewrote some questions from the perspective of “I.”  
For ambiguity intolerance, I used Budner’s (1962) scale (see Appendix 2) that 
has the important feature of separating the positive and negative items associated with 
ambiguity intolerance. Specifically, it constains sixteen items, eight positive and eight 
negative. Positive items are geared to check ambiguity intolerance, while negative items 
are designed to measure ambiguity tolerance. Thus, scoring of negative items is in the 
reverse direction.  Therefore, the sum of the scores from both positive and negative 
items is the measure of ambiguity intolerance.  
 
Collectivism vs. Individualism Scale 
 
Since the Singles’ (1994) scales of collectivism vs. individualism were developed 
on the basis of changes he introduced to other existing scales. Since converting and 
adapting scales to be relevant to different cultures requires sensitivity to the members of 
a culture, I tested the inter-reliability of the items with the total scores on each scale for 
the two cultures. 
Based on informal feedback from Korean and American students, I chose certain 
items from both questionnaires. In doing so I used two criteria. The first one reflects face 
validity of the items in terms of their relevance to the cultural dimensions.  Second, I 
considered the correlation between the items and the total for each subscale for the two 
cultural groups (See Table 4-1). Consequently, I selected six items for collectivism and 
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seven items for individualism respectively on the basis of the above standards (Appendix 
2 for the items selected). In the actual experiment, the final scales were presented in 
random sequence of items.  
 
Table 4-1: Correlation Scores of Selected Items with the New Totals 
Questionnaire Items Americans (n=253) Koreans (n=533) 
6 0.564 0.620 
7 0.523 0.663 
9 0.569 0.676 
10 0.598 0.661 
11 0.530 0.560 
 
 
 
Collectivism 
12 0.554 0.611 
14 0.618 0.593 
15 0.458 0.568 
16 0.553 0.416 
19 0.556 0.553 
21 0.551 0.498 
22 0.588 0.492 
 
 
 
Individualism 
23 0.479 0.492 
 
 
In the next stage I conducted ANOVA tests for the expected difference.  Overall, 
the two groups are significantly different along the cultural indexes: collectivism vs. 
individualism, and ambiguity intolerance. Korean participants are higher in collectivism, 
whereas American students are stronger in individualism than are Koreans subjects.  
Figure 4 -1 illustrates the mean scores of collectivism among the three groups. 
The degree of collectivism along the three groups is: Korean military (M=7.63); Korean 
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students (M=7.39); and American students (M=6.30). The differences are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level [F(2,783)=81.04, p<.0001]. Correspondingly, the Scheffe 
tests table (Table 4-2) shows that the difference between American students and Korean 
students are statistically significant, while both Korean groups are not different from 
each other.  
 
Figure 4-1: Mean Scores of Collectivism among Three 
Groups
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Figure 4-2 shows the mean scores of individualism among the three groups: 
American students (M=7.28), Korean students (M=6.61), Korean students (M=6.24). 
This pattern is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level [ F(2,783)=55.73, p<.0001].  
Table 4-3, the Scheffe tests table, demonstrates that the difference between American 
and Korean students is statistically significant. In this case, the Korean military is more 
individualistic than the students, but not as individualistic as the American students.  
 
Table 4-2 :  Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Collectivism Rating among Three 
Groups 
Group Mean Diff. P-value 
American students vs. Korean military -1.327 0.0001** 
American students vs. Korean students -1.087 0.0001** 
Korean military vs.  Korean students. 0.240 0.089 
Note: N. of observations: American students =253,  Korean military=213, Korean 
students=320,           *p<0.05, **p<0.01. 
Figure 4-2: Mean Ratings of Individualism among Three 
Groups
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Table 4-3: Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Individualism Rating among 
Three Groups 
Group Mean Diff. P-value 
American students vs. Korean military 0.662 0.0001*** 
American students vs. Korean students 1.041 0.0001*** 
Korean military vs. Korean students. 0.379 0.0014*** 
Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean 
students=320,    **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
 
In order to see which trait is stronger in each group, I calculated the difference 
between collectivism and individualism for each participant. A positive score 
indicates that the person is more collectivistic, and a negative score suggests that the 
person is more individualistic. 
Figure 4-3 shows us the gap between collectivism and individualism among 
those three groups: Korean groups are more collectivistic than Americans, whereas 
American subjects are stronger in individualism than Koreans participants. The 
difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level [F(2,783)=222.10, p<.0001].  Table 
4-4 is the Scheffe tests table that indicates statistical differences along the three 
groups. The results show that American students and Korean groups (students and 
military) are significantly different at 0.001 level [p<. 0001].  However, there is no 
statistical difference between the Korean military and Korean students.  
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Figure 4-3: Distance between the Mean Score of 
Collectivism and That of Individualism among Three 
Groups
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Ambiguity Intolerance Scale 
 
According to the following results, it appears that Koreans are less tolerant of 
ambiguity than are Americans.  Figure 4-4 illustrates the mean scores of ambiguity 
intolerance among these three groups.  Korean participants (Korean military and 
Table 4-4 : Scheffe Tests for the Distance between Mean of Collectivism and 
That of Individualism  
Group Mean Diff. P-value 
American students vs. Korean military -1.989 0.0001*** 
American students vs. Korean students -2.128 0.0001*** 
Korean military vs. Korean students. -0.139 0.478 
Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean 
students=320,           **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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students M=5.76) are less tolerant of ambiguity than are American students (M=4.71). 
However, there is no significant difference between the two Koreans groups.  This 
pattern is statistically significant at the 0.01 level[ F(2,783)=293.372, p<.0001]. The 
Scheff tests table (Table 4-5) shows that the difference is the statistically significant 
between American and Korean subjects only. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Mean Scores of Ambiguity Intolerance among 
Three Groups
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 In conclusion, as expected, American and Korean students are distinguishable in 
the three facets of cultural mindset: Korean students are more collectivistic than 
American students, less individualistic than American students, and less tolerant to 
ambiguity than their American counterparts. It is of interest that despite the age 
difference and career experience, both the Korean military and Korean students 
demonstrated similar patterns of cultural influence.13   
                                                 
13 With the exception along the individualism scale.  
Table 4-5: Scheffe Tests for the Difference in Ambiguity Intolerance Rating 
among Three Groups 
Group Mean Diff. P-value 
American students vs. Korean military -1.176 0.0001*** 
American students vs. Korean students -1.139 0.0001*** 
Korean military vs. Korean students. 0.038 0.792 
Note: N. of observations: American students =253, Korean military=213, Korean 
students=320,           **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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CHAPTER V 
 EXPERIMENT ONE- HUMANITARIAN ISSUE 
 
This chapter describes the setup of experiment 1, which deals with humanitarian 
issues, and discusses its results.  The empirical results are presented separately for choice 
and for the process parameters. The chapter ends with the discussion of the results.  
This experiment was designed to assess the degree to which expected casualties 
influence public foreign policy decision making in both America and South Korea. The 
experiment consisted of 2x3 factorial designs in which the factors were the saliency of 
the conflict (high salience and low salience) and the levels of expected casualties (5, 50, 
200). Three groups of participants were used in this experiment: 128 undergraduate 
students at Texas A&M University; 157 undergraduate students in South Korean 
universities; and 102 military officers at the Korean National Defense University.  Thus, 
the nature of the groups constituted the third independent variable. Participants in each 
society were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. They were asked to read about 
a hypothetical crisis occurring in Chagola, a fictional country in Africa, and then were 
asked to make a decision about whether or not their country should send troops to handle 
the crisis.  
The saliency manipulation was provided as part of the basic scenario. The 
manipulation of expected casualties was presented after the crisis scenarios as part of the 
information set.  Dependent variables were the choices participants made, the number of 
items viewed, the average amount of time taken to view an item of information, and the 
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proportion of recalled information from the information reviewed.  Simple recall may 
reflect the number of items reviewed. Thus, a variable to check the proportion of 
recalled items from all items reviewed was devised to indirectly measure- how much 
attention participants paid to the items of information they saw. In other words, this 
variable was designed to check sensitivity to information.  The average amount of time 
taken to view items was another measure of attention participants paid to each item.  
 
Experimental Procedure and Manipulations 
 
Participants were informed that they would be introduced to an ongoing conflict 
in Chagola. Then, they would be asked to decide whether or not their county should send 
troops as part of a U.N. force in order to mitigate the severity of the conflict. In this 
regard, all participants were acquainted with the Chagolian crisis via the following 
depiction: 
The U.N. Security Council has convened to review an ongoing conflict in 
Chagola, an African country.  The conflict, between rebel groups and the 
militia, recruited from local tribes and armed by Chagola’s government, 
has generated over 300,000 civilian deaths.  The militia, admittedly 
supported by the government, has ruthlessly attacked civilian villages in 
the region where rebel groups camp in order to eliminate the members of 
the rebel group.  The militia has killed noncombatants including women, 
the elderly, and even children in the villages.  
 
The Security Council defined the situation as “genocide” and decided to 
send a U.N. multi-national force of peacekeepers to enforce the U.N. 
resolution to stop the killing of civilians. The U.N. asked that the United 
States or South Korea provide a combat unit (almost a regiment – 1000 
soldiers) to participate in the forceful resolution of the crisis.  
 
Your task is to review new information about the crisis and decide 
whether or not your country should deploy a combatant to participate in 
this military mission.  
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The origins of the conflict have three dimensions: political, ethnic, and 
economic. Politically, Chagola’s current regime has long wanted to uproot 
the rebellious armed group in that region. In order to do this, Chagola’s 
government has recruited a militia from the local tribes, trained and armed 
them, and uses them to attack the rebellious groups.  Ethnically, the 
current government has strong characteristics of Arabic Africans. 
However, the region in which the rebels are housed is dominated by non-
Arabic Africans. Therefore, the militia, being controlled by the 
government, has directly targeted the non-Arabic Africans’ villages. In 
addition, the two ethnic groups have differing economic needs. The Arabic 
African tribes are nomadic, while the non-Arabic African tribes are 
farmers. These differing economic needs have led to clashes over access to 
land and water.  
 
In early 2003, the rebel groups accused the government of oppressing non-
Arabic tribes in favor of Arabic tribes, then initiating attacks by 
government forces and the militia group. In response to these attacks, the 
militia, controlled by the Chagola’s government, attacked the non-Arabic 
African villages, burned them, raped the women, and killed everyone from 
the youngest to the oldest. The Human Right Watch, a non-governmental 
organization monitoring human rights, estimates that over 300,000 people 
had already died by October 2005. In addition, these armed attacks against 
noncombatants resulted in unbearable starvation, disease, and refugees. 
More than 1.8 million people have been displaced from their homes. 
According to the WHO (the World Health Organization) by September 
2005, the estimated death toll was 50,000 from starvation and disease. 
 
The Manipulations 
As previously mentioned, the high salience case would be threats to members of 
the Red Cross of the participants’ own country, while a low salient case would be threats 
to members of the Red Cross from participants’ non-native country. Specifically, a high 
salience for American participants was that members of American Red Cross in the 
region were faced with serious security threats. A low salience case for American 
participants was that Korean Red Cross members were threatened by rebel forces. The 
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situation was reversed for the Korean participants.  Table 5-1 represents salience 
manipulations for the American participants and for the South Korean participants.  
 
 
Table 5-1: Salience Manipulations for Participants 
Groups Low salience High salience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Americans 
participants 
Korean Red Cross 
Since 2004, over fifty members of  
the Korean Red Cross have been 
dispatched to help the people in the 
region, and have attempted to 
provide food and medicines to the 
hungry and wounded. However, 
Chagola’s government and militia 
have prevented them from reaching 
the people most in need. Worse, 
militia groups have threatened 
some members of the Korean Red 
Cross who were trying to help.  
 
American Red Cross 
Since 2004, over fifty members of 
the American Red Cross have been 
dispatched to help the people in the 
region, and have attempted to 
provide food and medicines to the 
hungry and wounded. However, 
Chagola’s government and militia 
have prevented them from reaching 
the people most in need. Worse, 
militia groups have threatened some 
members of the American Red Cross 
who were trying to help.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koreans 
participants 
American Red Cross 
Since 2004, over fifty members of  
the American Red Cross have been 
dispatched to help the people in the 
region, and have attempted to 
provide food and medicines to the 
hungry and wounded. However, 
Chagola’s government and militia 
have prevented them from reaching 
the people most in need. Worse, 
militia groups have threatened 
some members of the American 
Red Cross who were trying to help. 
 
Korean Red Cross 
Since 2004, over fifty members of 
the Korean Red Cross have been 
dispatched to help the people in the 
region, and have attempted to 
provide food and medicines to the 
hungry and wounded. However, 
Chagola’s government and militia 
have prevented them from reaching 
the people most in need. Worse, 
militia groups have threatened some 
members of the Korean Red Cross 
who were trying to help.  
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The Information Sets14 
 
Immediately after reviewing the scenario, including saliency manipulation, 
participants were given the option of seeing as many additional information items as 
they wanted to help them in making their choice. The information set consisted of three 
sorts of items: items in support of sending troops (twelve items), against sending troops 
(six items), and neutral to sending troops (two items). Items were considered pro if they 
were in favor of the use of force policy.  
On the contrary, items against sending troops included “The Association of 
African Americans in the United States opposes sending troops to the region.”   Items 
were considered neutral if they were not related to the case, i.e., “Japan and the United 
States have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic satellite 
research in the Pacific.”  The sequence of the items reflected a pattern of against sending 
a force, for sending a force, and neutral for sending a force.   The first item of 
information, which is categorized as an item for not sending troops, is the expected 
casualties if the country dispatches their troops to the conflict. “The secretary of defense 
predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around 5, 50, 
200.”   
 
Results 
 
The first analyses compared the American students and Korean students. Then, I 
report the comparison of the Korean students and Korean military officers along some 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 1 for the information sets.  
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variables.  A 3x2x2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was employed for all the dependent 
variables. 
 
American Students vs. Korean Students 
 
Choice 
 
I coded the support for military deployment as 1 and 0 if the participant selected 
not to deploy forces. Figure 5-1 illustrates the proportion of participants who selected to 
deploy force as a function of the number of expected casualties (across groups and 
saliency of the conflict). While the pattern of the responses conforms to the expectations 
(i.e., more expected casualties less support of military deployment) this pattern did not 
reach an acceptable statistically significant level, [F(2, 273) =1.48].  It should be noted 
that this experimental factor did not affect the choices in either group [F<1.0]. 
The results show that American students are more likely to choose to send troops 
(M=.89), across both salience conditions and casualty levels, than are the Korean 
Students (M=.51). This contrast is statistically significant [F(1, 273)=59.46, p<0.0001]. 
But this pattern does not support hypothesis Ha1 which states that Korean students are 
more likely to support sending troops. In addition, the analysis did not yield the expected 
interaction between cultural group and the level of expected casualties. I will address 
these results in the discussion section of this chapter.   
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Process 
Number of items reviewed 
In terms of the experimental factors, the 3x2x2 ANOVA did not yield any main-
effects of the number of casualties or the salience of the conflict on the number of items 
participants reviewed. In general, participants made their choice after viewing an 
average of 6.78 items. As expected in proposition 3b and hypothesis Hb1b concerning 
the effect of AI on the decision threshold and thereby on the number of items used, the 
Korean students (who are less tolerant of ambiguity) reviewed fewer items (M=6.15) 
than the American students (M=7.53), [F(1,273)=3.05, p<0.05].15 Thus, the results 
support hypothesis Hb1b: Relative to Koreans, Americans who are more tolerant to 
                                                 
15 One-tailed 
Figure 5-1: Perception of Participants Suggesting 
Deployment of Troops as a Function of Casualties
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ambiguity, are more likely to review more items, will recall more of the items, and spend 
more time on items en route to final decision.  
There is a significant interaction effect of casualty, salience, and groups on the 
number of items reviewed (See Figure 5-2). This pattern is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level [F(2,273)=3.03, p<0.04].  American students usually requested more 
information for low and high casualties when it was of low salience. On the other hand, 
Korean students were just the opposite when casualties were in the mid-range. They 
asked for more information at low salience and at high salience. While I did not have 
any a-priori hypotheses for this interaction, the findings suggest that American students 
and Korean students are influenced differently by a combination of casualties and 
salience. So culture (group) mediates the effects of the two factors in a complex way.  
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Figure 5-2: Interaction Effects (Salience, Casualties, and 
Groups) on Items Reviewed
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Finally, to illustrate the applicability of the CC as a process model, I would 
expect that those who choose to send troops require more information than those who 
selected not to send troops. This expectation is based on the fact that since the first item 
in the information set is negatively valenced with regard to sending troops, it increases 
the distance of the choice propensity from the “send troops” threshold.  In fact (among 
the Korean students) those who selected to send troops attended to more items (M=6.55) 
than those who selected the other alternative (M=5.18), [F(1, 314)=2.83, p<0.05]16. 
                                                 
16 One-tailed, Not sending troops= 124, Sending troops=196. 
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Time used to review information 
I calculated for each participant the average time used per item (total decision 
time divided by number of items reviewed). The ANOVA yielded a significant main-
effect of saliency (See Table 5-2). When the conflict has a higher salience, participants 
were faster reviewing an information item (M=10.77 sec.) than when the salience was 
lower (M=13.08 sec.), [F (1,273)=3.45, p<0.06]. This result supports the notion of 
urgency (and lower TH) associated with salience. The outcome also supports the first 
part of hypothesis Hb217, namely, that saliency of the decision will decrease the time 
spent on the decision (urgency) while increasing attention to the items that have been 
reviewed (higher recall).    
 
 
 
Attention to items 
 
I operationalized the attention to information by assessing the number of items 
recalled at the final stages of the experiment. However, since American students viewed 
more items than their Korean counterparts, they have a larger pool of items to recall 
                                                 
17 The analysis shows that American students were significantly faster in reviewing an item of information 
than Korean students. However, since this main-effect may represent linguistic differences we have 
decided not to dwell on this contrast. 
 
Table 5-2: Mean of the Average Time Taken to View Each Information Item 
Salience Mean Std. Dev. 
High salience 10.77 6.94 
Low salience 13.08 12.35 
Note: N of observations High salience=193, Low salience=194 
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from. Hence, I calculated for each participant the proportion of correctly recalled items 
from the number of items she/he reviewed.  
The ANOVA shows a salience main-effect. In conditions of high salience 
subjects have a higher proportion of recall (.44) than in conditions of low salience (.35), 
[F(1,273)=4.63,p<0.04]. Hence, high saliency increased the urgency in the process 
making the decision makers work faster and pay more attention per item. 
In addition, American students exhibited a higher proportion of recall (.48) than 
do Korean students (.32), [F(1,273)=12.17, p<0.0006]. This pattern indicates that 
American students paid more attention to the information they reviewed than did Korean 
students, which confirms the notion that the American TH is higher than that of the 
Korean.    
 
Figure 5-3: Interaction Effect between Salience and 
Groups on the Proportion of Items Recalled
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Of interest is the two-way interaction between salience and cultural group on the 
proportion of items recalled, [F (1,272)=3.06, p<0.08]. Figure 5-3 shows that American 
students are more sensitive to salience than are Koreans students.   
 
Korean Students vs. Korean Military Officers 
 
Choice 
Although salience had no significant impact on choice [F (1,247)=0.04], 
casualties had a significant impact on choice (See Table 5-3). Specifically, Table 5-3 
indicates that casualty levels have a significant influence on choosing whether or not to 
send troops [F(1,247)=3.21, p<0.041]. In other words, it indicates that Koreans are more 
sensitive to casualty levels than Americans for whom the level of casualties had no 
effect.  
 
 
 
Regarding choice, as expected (c.f. Semmel and Minix 1979), Korean military 
officers are more likely to choose sending a force than are Korean students (see Table 5-
4). This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.01 level [F(1, 273)=18.64, p< 0.0001 ]. 
Semmel and Minix (1979) argue that soldiers are more likely to take aggressive position 
Table 5-3: Mean of Choosing to Send Troops 
Casualty levels Mean Std. Dev. 
Low casualty 0.71 0.45 
Mid casualty  0.57 0.49 
High casualty  0.53 0.50 
Note: N. of observations; low casualty 92, mid casualty 87, high casualty 80.  
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in foreign policy decision making than students as an expression of role expectations. 
Although different experiences and knowledge of the two groups may affect the choices, 
one can also consider Nincic and Nincic’s (1995) argument concerning differential 
perspectives of elites and the general public.  Here, it is reasonable to assume that the 
military officers (similar to elites) perceive the expected casualties as an investment with 
an expectation for future benefits. Meanwhile, students (similar to public) may view the 
expected casualties from a consumer perspective.   
 
Table 5-4: Mean of Selecting to Send Troops 
Groups Mean Std. Dev. 
Korean students 0.51 0.50 
Korean military  0.77 0.42 
Note: N  of observations Korean students=157, Korean military=102; Choice: sending troops-1, not 
sending troops-0. 
 
 
  
Process 
 
Korean military and students show no critical differences in the process of 
decision making except an interaction effect. A two-way interaction was obtained 
between salience and group. The pattern is illustrated in Figure 5-4. Korean military 
subjects spent more time reviewing information in cases of high salience, while Korean 
students put more time into viewing information in cases of low salience. This pattern is 
statistically significant at a 0.05 level [F(1,247)=6.12, p<0.014]. 
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Figure 5-4: Interaction Effect between Salience and 
Groups on Average Amount of Time Taken
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Summary of Findings 
 
In summary, Korean students are most sensitive to variations in casualties and to 
casualties in general. However, salience has no significant impact on the choice. 
Collectivism as a factor that should have affected the value of casualties is not confirmed 
by the experimental findings, especially due to the lack of interaction effect between 
groups and levels of casualties.  Treatment of salience does not have an effect.  
As for the decision process, as I expected, ambiguity tolerance has an impact on the 
process of decision making. Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity than are American 
students in their decisions. As Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) argued, intolerance of 
ambiguity lowers the threshold of decision making.  Accordingly, Korean students 
lowered their threshold and needed to view fewer items. In accordance with the number 
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of items reviewed, Korean students recalled fewer items than American students did. 
The ratio of recalled items from items reviewed is smaller for Korean students than for 
American students. It indicates that Korean students paid less attention to information 
than American students.18  
Salience has an effect on the process, especially for American students. Salience 
speeded the process but resulted in more recall, which expresses in increased attention. 
However, further research is required to prove if salience lowers or makes the decision 
threshold higher.  
 
Discussion  
 
Experiment 1 employed two types of dependent variables- choices either to send 
troops or to not send troops - and several process parameters, which are the number of 
items reviewed, proportion of recalled items, and average time taken to review each 
item. First, I will discuss some issues with regard to the two groups,- American students 
vs. Korean students. Then I will address issues from the three groups including the 
Korean military. 
 
 
                                                 
18 However, it is not consistent with the initial expectation that Korean students would spend more 
seconds reviewing each information item than American students. If Korean students used more time to 
review items, they should have recalled more items than American students. Thus, I contend that the 
linguistic difference between the English and Korean languages caused the inconsistency. Items of 
information in Korean were longer than those in English. Consequently, it required more time for Korean 
students to comprehend them.   
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Choice 
 
Putting it succinctly, unlike the suggestion of hypothesis Ha1, American students 
are more likely to choose to send troops (M=0.89) than Korean students (M=0.51).  
Korean choices are more sensitive to casualties. However, salience has no effect on the 
choice.  The results are contrary to my expectation, as the findings suggest that the 
casualty items had less weight for the Americans than for Koreans. 
There are two explanations for this finding. One is associated with the propensity 
for collectivism in the Korean culture interpreted by Kunda (1999). I have initially 
proposed that collectivism vs. individualism have an impact on the evaluation of costs 
(i.e. expected casualties). In other words, a collectivistic society (i.e. South Korea) puts 
less negative value on casualties than an individualistic society. However casualties are  
a cost in a cost-benefit analysis. Although Bragg (2006) argues that people are inclined 
to focus more on the costs of political decisions than on the benefits, we need to 
recognize that support for sending troops is a function of the costs and benefits of the 
intervention.  
It is plausible in the humanitarian context, that South Korean students and 
American students define benefits from military intervention differently. It is also 
possible that the collectivist orientation of the Koreans is focused on a narrow in-group 
concept. Hence, the Koreans may be less sensitive to the perils of the victims of the 
humanitarian crisis than the Americans. In other words, although Korean students and 
American students perceive the same costs (same number of expected casualties in the 
experiment), the perceptions of benefits are different for both cases. Therefore, Korean 
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students and American students show different levels of support for sending troops 
because of the different anticipated benefits resulting from the military intervention.  
I explore this argument in the second experiment of this project where the 
scenario offers similar benefits to the Korean and American students. Specifically, the 
second experiment involves security threats that are relevant to both societies.  Here, 
Korean students and American students may expect similar benefits from a military 
intervention associated with a security issue than from a military intervention associated 
with a humanitarian issue.   
In addition, one might also consider the argument of habituation (Mueller 1979). 
The numerous cases of military interventions and casualties associated with the U.S. 
foreign policy could have made Americans less sensitive to the expected number of 
casualties. On the other hand, fewer cases of military interventions and casualties in 
Korean history may have led Koreans to be more responsive to the expected casualties.  
As Muller (1973) contends, public becomes habituated to casualties.  It is plausible that 
numerous past cases of military interventions and casualties incurred have made 
Americans less sensitive to the expected number of casualties. In fact, since 1946 the 
United States has been involved in eighty cases of military interventions while Korea has 
participated in eleven cases of international military operations. Regarding military 
casualties resulting from those military interventions, the United States has suffered a 
significant number of casualties: the Korean War (33,714), the Vietnam War (58,226), 
and the Gulf War (382). Currently the ongoing war in Iraq has produced nearly 3,000 
deaths. However, for South Korea, after the Vietnam War where 4,770 Korean solders 
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were killed, no considerable number of casualties has been associated with military 
interventions.  Hence, it is plausible that Americans have become habituated to 
casualties, and are less sensitive to them, while Koreans are more susceptible to numbers 
of casualties.  
The argument of habituation is acceptable if I refer to the temporal contexts of 
administration of the experiments. The American public was somewhat habituated to 
casualties since the War in Iraq which began in 2003. During September and October of 
2006 when conducting the experiments, the numbers of the U.S. casualties were around 
three thousand. These actual casualties may cause Americans to be less sensitive to 
potential casualties.  
Finally, the observed differences in policy preferences between the Koreans and 
the Americans may be considered within the general debate on the effects of institutional 
versus cultural factors. As Moskos (1996) argues, institutional ingredients may have an 
impact on the different perception of casualties, especially, since South Korea and the 
U.S. have adapted different military personnel policies.  South Korea has utilized a draft 
for their armed forces, while America has employed voluntary military recruitment in 
past Vietnam War. As such, it is plausible that this institutional difference accounts for 
the increased level of sensitivity among Koreans toward casualties compared to the 
Americans. Exploring this possibility in a future study would provide a promising 
research topic. 
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Regarding the impact of salience on choice, the fact that the target of hostilities, 
which defined saliency, had no impact on the choice suggests that the subjects did not 
consider this element as part of the choice calculus.  
 
Decision Process 
 
Korean students are less tolerant of ambiguity. They operated with a more lenient 
threshold than American students. Hence, I hypothesized that Korean students would 
likely make a decision after reviewing fewer items than American students.  The 
empirical results support this hypothesis (Hb1b) that Korean students arrived at a 
decision with fewer items.  
Since we assumed that for Korean students the casualty information items had 
more impact than for Americans, and since it is a negative and the first item, and since 
all the rest of items were pointing at both directions, then Korean students who selected 
to send troops needed more information than those who selected the not send troops 
option. Those who chose not send troops made it on the basis of fewer items than these 
who chose to send troops.  Specifically all participants began the decision process with 
negative information: the first item of information to be seen was the expected number 
of casualties, participants who chose to send troops made the decision at greater distance 
from the threshold than those who chose not to send troops. Consequently, under these 
conditions, the Cognitive Calculus model requires more information to support the 
sending of troops choice than the decision not to sending troops. Empirical evidence 
supports the prediction that participants who selected to send troops needed more 
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information to reach the threshold than the participants choosing not to send troops. It, 
therefore, expands the support for the Cognitive Calculus decision model.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 EXPERIMENT TWO-SECURITY ISSUE 
 
As with experiment 1, this experiment was designed to assess the degree to 
which expected casualties influence military foreign policy decision making in both 
America and South Korea. However, in contrast to experiment 1, experiment 2 focused 
on the condition of national security concern.  Two goals were pursued in these two 
experiments: I predicted that the two different conditions, a humanitarian issue vs. a 
security issue, resulted in the differing perceptions of casualties. As I argued in chapter 
V, it is reasonable to consider both the costs and benefits involved in decision making. 
Consequently, the experiment associated with the security issue would present more 
similar benefits for both Korean students and American students than the experiment 
associated with the humanitarian issue. Thus, I expected that Americans and Koreans 
would interpret expected casualties differently as they pertain to security concerns.  
The outline of experiment 2 is the same as for experiment 1: The experiment 
consisted of a 2x3 factorial design in which the factors were saliency manipulation (high 
salience and low salience) and the levels of expected casualties (5, 50, 200). The three 
groups of participants who took part in this experiment consisted of 125 undergraduate 
students at Texas A&M University, 163 undergraduate students in South Korea, and 108 
military officers at the Korea National Defense University.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Participants read about a fictitious crisis 
occurring in Chagola, a hypothetical country in Southern Asia and then were asked to 
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make a decision about whether or not the United States (Korea) should send troops try 
and help contain the crisis.  
The saliency manipulation was presented as part of the basic scenario and 
manipulation of expected casualties was offered after the crisis scenarios as part of the 
information set. Dependent variables which were designed to delineate both the choice 
itself and decision process included: the choices subjects made, the number of items 
reviewed, recall of information from the information sets, the average amount of time 
used to review the information, and the proportion of recalled information from the 
information reviewed.   
 
Experimental Procedure and Manipulations 
 
The main elements of the context of experiment 2 included a failed state, concern 
over nuclear non-proliferation, and international terrorism. The scenario described an 
unstable state that supported international terrorism and has illegally invaded a 
neighboring country to possess its natural uranium field. International terror 
organizations, who had bombed Americans (Koreans), were suspected to be associated 
with this state. The U.N. tried to cope with the illegitimate attack, by urging America 
(South Korea) to send troops and to help organize U.N. coalition forces.  
Participants were asked to read about ongoing security threats in Chaloga, a 
hypothetical state.  Then, they were asked to decide whether or not their county should 
send troops or not in order to respond to the terrorists attacks. All participants were 
introduced to the Chagolian crisis via the following depiction: 
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Introductory Scenario 
 
The U.N. Security Council has reviewed an emerging issue between two 
small maritime states in Southeast Asia: Chagola and Sagonia.  Chagola 
has invaded Sagonia, a neighboring country, in order to gain exclusive 
control of a uranium field, which has recently been discovered near the 
border between the two states.  As a result of this offensive, Chagola now 
controls two major cities in Sagonia, which forced Sagonia to abandon all 
rights to the uranium field. 
The U.N. defined the Chagolan attack as an illegitimate invasion, and has 
urged Chagola to withdraw its forces from Sagonia immediately.  
Unfortunately, all diplomatic efforts by the U.N. to negotiate a withdrawal 
of Chagola’s forces from Sagonia have failed.  The U.N. Security Council 
authorized a multi-national force to enforce the U.N. resolution.  
Specifically, the U.N. asks that the United States (Korea) provide a 
combat unit (almost a regiment – 1,000 soldiers) to participate in the 
forceful resolution of the crisis. 
  
Your task is to review new information about the crisis and decide 
whether or not your country should deploy combatants to participate in 
this military operation. 
 
Chagola 
 
Chagola is a small independent nation in Southeast Asia, on the rim of the 
western Pacific, with a population of 20 million people.  Chagola is a 
mountainous nation with a dense tropical forest.  Becoming an 
independent state after World War II, Chagola has been unstable because 
of its young democracy and conflicts among various tribes.  In 1990, an 
army general, Sardi, seized political power through a military coup.  In 
spite of intense efforts to develop its economy, Chagola’s financial 
problems have been exacerbated.  In order to resolve these political and 
economic difficulties, Sardi wishes to divert the public’s attention to the 
external world.  He insists that Chagola’s hardships have chiefly been 
caused by the so called modern imperialists who profit from exploration 
and use of raw materials and labor in Chagola.  Because of this, he 
implemented an aggressive foreign policy toward the developed states.  
Worse, he admittedly supports international terrorism and has made 
alliances with international terror organizations.  He has provided them 
with shelter, training facilities, and even weaponry.  In addition, a few 
internationally known terrorist organizations have been harbored in 
Chagola’s dense forest. 
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The recent discovery of uranium near the country’s border with Sagonia, a 
neighboring state, has raised questions of who owns the territory in which 
the uranium was found.  The large quantity and high quality of the 
uranium make developing a nuclear weapon easy.  In the midst of these 
tense negotiations, Chagola launched a ground attack in order to take 
exclusive control of the uranium field.  Most western states are worried 
that if Chagola controls the field, there is a very high probability that they 
will sell the uranium to various parties, including rogue nations and 
terrorist groups. 
 
The Manipulations 
 
As I stated earlier, the high salience case would be a terrorist attack on the 
participant’s own country, while a low salient case would be a terrorist attack to 
participants’ non-native country. For instance, a high salience for American participants 
would be that terrorists attacked and consequently killed a certain number of Americans 
in the region.  A low salience case for American participants would be that Koreans in 
the region were targeted and killed by terrorists.  Table 6-1 illustrates the details of the 
saliency manipulations.  
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Table 6-1: Salience Manipulations for Participants 
Groups Low salience High salience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Americans 
participants 
In addition, Chagola’s regime has been 
accused of supporting several terrorist 
attacks.  The regime has also publicly 
criticized Korea’s economic foreign policy 
toward South Asia as modern imperialism 
because Korea has been the leading figure in 
foreign investment and trade in South Asia.  
An apartment building in Sagonia, the 
neighboring country of Chagola, exploded on 
the 13th of last month at 8:00 p.m., causing 
partial destruction of the building and killing 
twenty-three and injuring many Koreans, 
including women and children.  Many Korean 
workers lived in the apartments, most of them 
in managerial positions in a Korean 
investment enterprise.  Two terrorist groups 
harbored in Chagola admitted responsibility 
for the bombing.  Most western states 
affirmed that the Chagolan regime was 
undoubtedly connected to the attack and the 
Korean government is seeking ways to 
respond. 
 
In addition, Chagola’s regime has 
been accused of supporting several 
terrorist attacks.  On the 12th of last 
month, a bus carrying Americans 
exploded at 12:30 p.m. in the capital 
city of Sagonia, a neighboring 
country of Chagola,  as it pulled up 
to its stop in front of the restaurant 
California, known to be frequented 
by Americans living in Sagonia, 
particularly U.S. embassy staff.  The 
blast killed twenty-three and injured 
many, including women and 
children.  The two terrorist 
organizations harbored in Chagola 
claimed responsibility for the 
explosion.  The CIA has tracked 
down a connection between the 
suspected terrorist groups and 
Chagola’s regime.  The U.S. 
government has imposed economic 
sanctions on Chagola as a result of 
the support of the terrorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koreans 
participants 
In addition, Chagola’s regime has been 
accused of supporting several terrorist 
attacks.  On the 12th of last month, a bus 
carrying Americans exploded at 12:30 p.m. in 
the capital city of Sagonia, a neighboring 
country of Chagola,  as it pulled up to its stop 
in front of the restaurant California, known to 
be frequented by Americans living in 
Sagonia, particularly U.S. embassy staff.  The 
blast killed twenty-three and injured many, 
including women and children.  The two 
terrorist organizations harbored in Chagola 
claimed responsibility for the explosion.  The 
CIA has tracked down a connection between 
the suspected terrorist groups and Chagola’s 
regime.  The U.S. government has imposed 
economic sanctions on Chagola as a result of 
the support of the terrorists. 
 
In addition, Chagola’s regime has 
been accused of supporting a couple 
of terrorist attacks.  The regime has 
also publicly criticized Korea’s 
economic foreign policy toward 
South Asia as modern imperialism 
because Korea has been the leading 
figure in foreign investment and 
trade in South Asia.  An apartment 
building in Sagonia, the neighboring 
country of Chagola, exploded on the 
13th of last month at 8:00 p.m., 
causing partial destruction of the 
building and killing twenty-three and 
injuring many Koreans, including 
women and children.  Many Korean 
workers lived in the apartments, most 
of them in managerial positions in a 
Korean investment enterprise.  Two 
terrorist groups harbored in Chagola 
admitted responsibility for the 
bombing.  Most western states 
affirmed that the Chagolan regime 
was undoubtedly connected to the 
attack and the Korean government is 
seeking ways to respond. 
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The Information Set19 
 
After reviewing the scenario, including saliency manipulation, participants were 
introduced to additional information to help them make the decision of whether or not to 
deploy their country’s forces to the region. Participants could review information up to a 
point at which they selected one of the options or exhausted all the information because 
the participants had control over the inflow of the information.   
The information set consisted of the three sorts of items: pro to sending troops 
(twelve items), against-sending troops (six items), and neutral to sending troops (two 
items). Items were considered pro to sending troops if they were in favor of a use of 
force policy. An instance of pro to sending troops is “A recent national survey indicates 
that over 80% of Americans believe that the United States should use of force against 
Chagola.”  On the contrary, items were viewed as against sending troops if they were not 
supportive of the use of force policy. The items included “Several analysts were against 
multi-national forces because eventually the United States will pay the major price.”  
Neutral items were considered if they were not related to the case, i.e. “Japan and the 
United States have established a new research and development fund for Oceanographic 
Satellite research in the Pacific.”  The sequence of the items was against sending forces, 
pro to sending forces, and neutral to sending forces. The first item of information is the 
expected casualties, categorized as an item for not sending troops: “The secretary of 
defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military operation will be around 5, 
(50, 200).” 
                                                 
19 See Appendix1 for the full information sets.  
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Results 
 
The first set of analyses compared the American students and Korean students. 
Then, a comparison of Korean students and Korean military officers is presented.  A 
3x2x2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) is employed for all the dependent variables.  
 
American Students vs. Korean Students 
 
Choice 
 
Neither casualty nor salience has a statistically significant impact on the choice, 
but the direction of impact of one of the variables matches my expectations: The more 
the expected casualties, the less likely are participants to choose the sending of troops 
option [F (2, 378) =1.49].   
Table 6-2 shows that American students are more likely to choose the sending of 
troops option than Korean students across salience conditions and casualty levels. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level [F(1, 276)=12.41, p<0.0005]. This 
pattern is consistent with the finding in the previous chapter (humanitarian context). The 
result is different from the hypothesis Ha1 that Korean students would be more inclined 
to select the sending troops policy.  As I proposed in Chapter V, the two explanations 
Table 6-2: Propensity to Send Troops 
Groups Mean Std. Dev 
American students 0.88 0.32 
Korean students 0.71 0.45 
Note: N  of observations American students=125, Korean students=163; Choice: sending troops-1, not 
sending troops-0. 
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would be plausible for this result. I will elaborate it in detail in the following section that 
presents the differences of the two experiments. 
Although American students did not present a significantly different propensity 
in terms of  “to send troops,” in the two experiments,  the Korean students’ propensity 
for sending troops is greater in the security issue condition (M=0.71) than in the 
humanitarian issue condition (M=0.51). I delineate this difference between American 
students and Korean students in a later part of this chapter.    
 
Process 
 
Number of items reviewed 
Salience has a significant impact on number of items reviewed: The higher the 
salience issue, the less participants needed to access items (See Table 6-3, F(1, 
276)=5.06, p<0.0255).  This supports Hb2 that high salience implies urgency and lowers 
the decision threshold. Consequently, participants needed to review fewer numbers of 
items when dealing with high salience than with low salience. However, no significant 
difference was detected with regard to the number of items reviewed between the two 
cultural groups.  
 
Table 6-3: Number of Items Reviewed 
Salience Mean Std. Dev 
High salience 5.29 0.50 
Low salience 6.78 0.56 
Note: N of observations High salience=147, Low salience=141 
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Figure 6-1: Interaction Effect between Salience and 
Groups on Items Reviewed
4.68
5.79
7.84
6.01
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
American students Korean students
groups
Note:  N.of obesevations, American 
students=125,Korean students=163. 
ite
m
s
high salience
low salience
 
 
The interaction effect between salience and groups on items accessed is 
illustrated in Figure 6-1. The difference in the number of items between high salience 
and low salience is greater with American students than with Korean students. Thus, it 
indicates that American students are more sensitive to salience than are Korean students 
with regard to the amount of information reviewed. In addition, this interaction is a part 
of the replication of the result from the experiment with a humanitarian context. More 
specifically, American students reviewed more items when dealing with humanitarian 
issues than did Korean students. Figure 6-1 shows that American students reviewed  
more items than did Korean students in the case of low salience only. Thus, this partially 
supports the finding from the experiment with a humanitarian context.  
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Time used to review information 
Table 6-4 tells us that American students are faster in reviewing each information 
item than Korean students. This is consistent with the results of experiment 1 and the 
pattern is statistically significant at 0.1 the level [F(1,276)=2.84, p<0.092].  
Figure 6-2 illustrates the interactive effect of salience and group on average time 
used per item. These results indicate that Korean students are more diverse between low 
salience and high salience with the time used to see each piece of information than 
American students. This pattern is statistically significant at the 0.1 level [F 
(2,276)=3.27, p<0.071]. Comparing Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2, demonstrates the 
differing ways in dealing with urgency between the two groups. American students took 
the same amount of time read items across salience, but they needed fewer items in cases 
of high salience. Alternatively, Korean students responded to urgency in a manner 
opposite to American students: Korean students needed almost the same amount of 
information across salience. However, they were almost twice as fast at reviewing each 
item with high salience.  
 
Table 6-4: Mean of the Average Time Taken to View Each Information Item   
Groups Mean Std. Dev 
American students 12.06 6.18 
Koreans students 17.93 39.23 
Note: N  of observations American students=125, Korean students=163. 
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Figure 6-2: Interaction Effect between Salience and 
Groups on Average Time Used
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Korean Students vs. Korean Military Officers 
 
Choice 
Korean military officers and Korean students are different in choosing whether or 
not to send troops: Korean military officers are more likely to choose to send troops than 
are Korean students. It is similar to the result from the experiment on the humanitarian 
issue.  Table 6-5 shows the difference which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level20 
[F(1, 259)=5.15, p<0.024].   
 
                                                 
20 Korean military officers are closer to the propensity of American students.  
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Process 
Items reviewed 
Among the three independent variables, each group had a unique impact on the 
number of items reviewed: Korean military officers viewed more items than did Korean 
students. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level [See Table 6-6 
F(1,262)=4.29, p<0.39]. However, neither salience nor casualty has a significant impact 
on the number of items reviewed.  
 
Table 6-6: Number of Information Items Reviewed   
Groups Mean Std. Dev 
Korean military  7.70 8.08 
Korean students 5.90 6.79 
Note: N  of observations Korean military=111, Korean students=163 
 
 
Time used to review information 
Table 6-7 indicates that Korean students spent more time per information item than 
the Korean military officers did. This difference is statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
[F (1,262)=3.17, p <0.075].  This pattern is consistent with the results from experiment 
Table 6-5: Means of Selecting to Send Troops 
Groups Mean Std. Dev 
Korean military 0.83 0.37 
Korean students  0.71 0.45 
Note: N of observations Korean students=163, Korean military=108 ; Choice: sending troops-1, not 
sending troops-0. 
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1. It seems likely that Korean students are less familiar with situations or terms 
associated with national security. Hence, they needed more time to comprehend the 
information.  
 
 
 
Summary of Findings  
 
In summary, in contrast to hypothesis (Ha1) Korean students are more sensitive 
to variations in casualties. However, salience had no significant impact on the choice. 
Cultural factors, collectivism and individualism, also did not affect the choice. With 
regard to the processing of decisions, intolerance of ambiguity lowers the threshold of 
decision making and expedites the process in general.  Higher salience seems to lower 
the threshold and requires fewer information items than lower salience, which supports 
Hypothesis (Hb1b). However, casualties do not have a significant impact on the process, 
which supports Hypothesis (Hb2).  
 
Discussion 
 
In this experiment 2, as in experiment 1, I examined two types of dependent 
variables. First of all, I will discuss some issues with regard to two groups: American 
Table 6-7: Mean Average Time Taken to Review Each Information Item  
Groups Mean Std. Dev 
Korean military  11.24 5.86 
Koreans students 17.93 39.23 
Note: N of observations Korean military=111, Korean students=163 
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students vs. Korean students, then later I will address issues from three groups including 
the Korean military. 
 
Choice 
 
Over all, American students are more likely to choose to send troops (M=0.88) 
than are Korean students (M=0.71). This is different from my expectation, but frequent 
experiences of military interventions and incurred casualties would be an alternative 
reason for a cultural explanation (collectivism and individualism). However, neither 
salience nor casualties have a significant impact on the choice.  Regarding the impact of 
salience on the choice, the fact that the target of hostilities which defined saliency had no 
impact on the choice suggests that the subjects did not consider this element as part of 
choice calculus.  
 
Decision Process 
 
Unlike experiment 1, salience has significant impacts on the decision process in 
experiment 2. Specifically, salience affects the number of items reviewed, time used to 
review information, and the average time used to review information.   Participants 
evaluating items of high salience needed fewer items than with low salience. Therefore, I 
argue that high salience lowers the threshold of decision making.  
The level of expected casualties has an impact on the time used to review 
information only with Korean subjects. The more casualties expected, the more time 
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participants used. Thus, I conclude that Koreans are more sensitive to the level of 
expected casualties than American students.  
The groups affected the number of items reviewed, the average amount of time 
taken to view each item of information, and the number of items recalled. Examining 
Figure 6-2, for Americans, high salience decreases the number of items reviewed but the 
same attention is given to items across salience. For Koreans, salience does not affect the 
number of items, but does affect the attention to the items read.  
 
The Differences between the Two Experiments 
 
In this section, I present some differences of decision choices between the two 
experiments. Humanitarian issue oriented and security issue oriented experiments have 
different impacts on the decision choice.  
 The difference of the mean rating of choosing to send troops between the 
humanitarian and security case is far greater with Korean participants than with 
American students (See Figure 6-3). Specifically, as we see in Figure 6-3, the proportion 
of choosing to send troops for American students is almost the same in the two cases. 
However, the case of Korean students is more distinguishable.  How can we account for 
the differences between American students and Korean students in terms of the 
proportion of selecting to send troops?   
I suggest two explanations in the discussion of Chapter V. I propose that 
collectivism offers an excellent explanation. Kunda (1999) contends that the definition 
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of the in-group is narrower in collectivistic society than in less collectivistic one. These 
individuals are less concerned about others’ welfare than themselves.  
In other words, the size of in-group defined is smaller with Korean participants 
than with American participants since Koreans are more collectivistic than Americans. 
Thus, Korean participants are less concerned with others’ issues than are American 
participants.  By this logic, the humanitarian crisis was less attractive to Korean subjects 
than the security issue oriented crisis because the humanitarian issue may be located 
beyond Korean’s boundary of their defined in-group. Therefore, the difference between 
the proportion of sending troops in a humanitarian case and in a security case is greater 
with Korean students than with American students.  
  
Figure 6-3: Mean Ratings of Selecting to Send Troops
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Level of casualties and salience are perceived as more critical in humanitarian 
settings than in security settings. Several results indicate that participants consider 
casualties more seriously in the humanitarian setting than in the security setting. It is 
reasonable that participants become more deterministic with security issues than with 
humanitarian issues, regardless of its costs. Because security threatens directly, people 
are more likely to be responsive to the given threats, even more aggressive in response to 
security issues than humanitarian ones. Therefore, casualty and salience would become 
less important in the decision calculus with a security issue than with a humanitarian 
issue.  
As I argued in chapter V, the policy choice reflects not only the costs (i.e. 
casualties), but the expected benefits. Furthermore, it was suggested that the security 
context may overcome the “narrowness” associated with the Korean “ingroup” concept 
and consequently “push” the Koreans to increase support for military intervention in this 
context compared to the humanitarian scenario.   
 In addition, casualties have been considered more with Korean subjects in 
general than with American subjects.  Specifically, casualties have a statistically 
significant impact on the decision choice only with the Korean military and Korean 
students in the humanitarian issue.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
 
Purpose 
 
This case study was developed to support the two principal findings of 
experiments conducted to determine the influence that the number of possible casualties 
had on decisions made by South Koreans and Americans about whether or not to involve 
troops in a conflict. The results of the two experiments indicate that Korean participants 
are more sensitive to casualties than are Americans.  
Regarding the process of decision making, the results from the experiments 
indicate that Koreans are less tolerant of ambiguity, and this lowers the threshold at 
which decisions are made. Consequently, the Koreans needed less information and took 
much less time to reach a final decision.  In this case study, I want to confirm the results 
obtained from the two experiments with two cases from America and South Korea.  In 
compliance with the results, it was necessary to choose a case that was expected to have 
casualties and to gauge the American and South Korean public’s reactions to them.  
 
Case Selection 
 
I selected two humanitarian military interventions for analysis, one each by 
America and South Korea.  I chose these cases because the experimental analysis 
showed that casualties were more seriously considered in humanitarian issues than in 
security issues.  Thus, humanitarian military interventions are more appropriate in 
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presenting the differing perception of casualties and different patterns of ambiguity 
intolerance of two different cultures.   
Between the two prominent comparative methods, Most Similar System design 
(hereinafter MSS) and Most Different System design (hereinafter MDS), I employed the 
MSS design. The degree of variation across cases in the dependent variables is most 
prominent difference between them (Frendresis 1983: 263). Researchers need to select 
cases as similar as possible for the MSS design and the cases should present 
considerable variances with regard to the dependent variables. On the other hand, in the 
MDS approach, the selected cases should show different systemic characteristics where 
there are no major differences in the dependent variables. The experimental findings are 
different in the dependent variables, which are decision outcomes and some decision 
process parameters. Hence, the MSS design is appropriate for this case study.  
The MSS design is used in cases in which political systems are highly similar or 
identical in as many ways as possible, with the exception of the variables to be examined 
(Lijphart 1971).  However, the field of possible choices for South Korea was very 
limited due to the relatively few cases of such interventions. I considered four variables 
which needed to be as similar as possible for both the American and Korean cases. First, 
the temporal contexts of the two cases should be as close as possible. The perception of 
casualties may vary based on time.  In other words, the perception of casualties would be 
different in the 1980s and the 1990s. Secondly, each case is required to be near each 
country geographically.  As experiment 1 shows, a humanitarian case in an African 
country could not draw proper attention from Korean subjects. Third, each case is 
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required to be approved by the U.N. or be a U.N. requested military intervention because 
Larson (1996) argues that international support mediates the sensitivity to casualties.  
The forth factor is that the cases need to include concern for potential casualties so 
different impacts of expected casualties could be examined.  
Taking into consideration the factors mentioned above, I examined the decision 
to send troops to East Timor in September 1999, as requested by the U.N.  The U.S. 
involvement in Haiti September 1994 is examined for the American case. The two cases 
developed during the same historical era. The U.S. involvement in Haiti was under 
President Clinton’s presidency and in 1999, the Korean government was under President 
Dae Jung Kim. Geographically, the two cases are not far from the two countries 
respectively. The East Timor humanitarian crisis occurred in South East Asia near South 
Korea. Haiti is a state in the Caribbean sea where there are U.S. interests. The two cases 
were supported by the U.N., which is very significant for public support for the use of 
force (Larson 1996).  Fourth, both cases included the concern of expected casualties.  
 
South Korean Military Involvement in East Timor, 1999 
 
Background 
 
East Timor, officially the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste or Timor-Leste, 
is a state in Southeast Asia consisting of the eastern half of the island of Timor. It is 
located about 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia.  
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony with a Roman Catholic cultural 
identity until 28 November 1975, when it declared its independence from Portugal.  But 
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within ninety days of declaring independence, it was invaded by Indonesia and was 
annexed as the province of East Timor.  
For almost two decades, from 1975 to 1999, there had been a ceaseless East 
Timorese guerrilla war against the Indonesian forces.  During this unstable period, 
Indonesia’s desperate efforts to incorporate them resulted in abuse of the East Timorese 
by Indonesia’s military forces, allegedly causing 100,000 to 250,000 Timorese deaths.21  
In the end, the Indonesian government allowed the East Timorese to choose   
through popular referendum whether they wanted independence or to remain an 
autonomous province of Indonesia.  The East Timorese overwhelmingly voted for 
independence in a U.N. sponsored vote on August 30,1999.  As a result, East Timor was 
plunged into chaos because pro-Indonesian factions intensified their attacks on the East 
Timor populace.  
The Indonesian government announced a decision to allow U.N. peace-keeping 
forces to come into its chaotic land to try and pacify violence-torn East Timor.  
Including South Korea, eighteen countries joined together to form a U.N. coalition force 
to stop the killing of Timorese by the anti-government militia in 1999.22  Australia 
pledged the major role in sending troops and conducting peace-keeping operations 
(PKO) in East Timor. The South Korean government decided to send a total of 419 
troops to East Timor to join the U.N. peace-keeping mission.  It marked the first dispatch 
of South Korean combat soldiers to a foreign country since the Vietnam War.  
                                                 
21 See CIA World Fact Book, East Timor crisis.  
22 Australia 4,747 (49%), Thailand 1,584 (16%), Philippines 658 (7%), Canada 592 (6%), South Korea 
419 (4%), Italy 274 (3%), Kenya 254 (3%), Portugal 207 (2%), United Sates 112 (1%), France 105 (1%), 
Germany 73 (1%), Brazil 48 (0.5%), Island 41, Malaysia 30, Singapore 30, Jordan 19, Fiji 6, Norway 4, 
Denmark 2. Total 9643. 1999. 12.  Choi 2006,  69.  
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Concern over Possible Casualties  
 
The Grand National Party (GNP), a major opposition party, was at the center in 
raising possible casualty concerns when congressmen met to decide the issue of whether 
or not to send troops to join the U.N. coalition (Korea Times September 17, 1994). The 
GNP argued that the dispatched troops could be driven into armed clashes with the anti-
independence Indonesian militiamen, incurring casualties among the Korean soldiers. 
Furthermore, they condemned President Dae Jung Kim for jeopardizing soldiers for the 
sake of his own interests.23 Another concern raised by the opposition party was 
diplomatic: that a military deployment would have an especially negative impact on the 
nation’s ties with Indonesia.  
As a matter of fact, South Korea has sustained an amenable relationship with 
Indonesia, both diplomatically and economically. Indonesia has been the fourth largest 
trade partner of South Korea for many years. More importantly, around ten thousand 
South Koreans currently live in Indonesia and any negative impact on the relationship 
between the two states could endanger the safety of these Koreans.  
As a result of this argument, the government and ruling party took both 
diplomatic and military measures.  Diplomatically, Sunyoung Hong, minister of 
diplomacy and foreign trade, called the ambassador of Indonesia in Seoul to gauge the 
Indonesian government’s reaction to the possibility of South Korea dispatching troops to 
East Timor.  The ambassador provided a positive response from Indonesia about sending 
                                                 
23 Some lawmakers from the opposition party alleged that President Kim hoped to earn the Nobel Peace 
Prize,that he intended to help East Timor in order to earn a good reputation internationally (Korea Times 
September 15, 1994).  
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Korean troops (Dongal Ilbo, September 21, 1999). Another step the Korean government 
took was to send a team of special envoys, who had contacts high in the Indonesian 
military, to Indonesia to determine the possible reaction of Indonesian politicians. They 
met with several high ranking individuals in the Indonesian military, including army 
chief of staff Wiranto. They were assured that Korean troops would be safe if they took a 
neutral position on the independence issue of East Timor.  
The concern of possible casualties influenced the mission of the Korean troops. 
The Korean government had encountered serious opposition from the GNP, who wanted 
to minimize the risks that might lead to Korean casualties (Choi 2003). Thus, the Korean 
ministry of Defense firmly confined the mission of Korean troops in East Timor to 
concentrate purely on humanitarian operations. So, the main body of Korean troops were 
medics and engineers and the rest of them were combat units for providing security only. 
In order to reinforce this intention, Korean troops took charge of Lautem, an eastern part 
of Timor, where there was less opportunity to face anti-independence militia and, 
consequently, less chance to suffer casualties.  
In addition, the concern over casualties had an impact on the configuration of 
troops sent. The Korean government contended that the inclusion of a combat unit was 
necessary in order to protect military medics and engineers from possible attack by the 
anti-independence militiamen (Korea Herald September 16, 1999). Specifically, Vice-
foreign Minister Joun-yung Sun said that the government planned to dispatch armed 
infantry for protection against provocations by the armed East Timorese militias (Korea 
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Herald September 18, 1999). In other words, the infantries deployed as part of their 
military contingent went as force protection, not as fighting units.  
Fortunately, no combat casualties occurred when Korean troops worked toward 
ameliorating East Timor’s stability.  However, five Korean soldiers died in an accident 
when they drowned in a flash flood in East Timor.   
 
Ambiguity Intolerance 
 
Regarding the decision, ambiguity intolerance resulted in very fast decision 
making and required little information.  Empirical evidence shows that Koreans are less 
tolerant of ambiguity than Americans, which lowers the decision-making threshold.  
Consequently, Koreans need less information and take less time to reach a final decision.  
The Korean government had been quick in making the decision to send troops to 
East Timor. In addition, the Korean government attempted to expedite the 
implementation of the decision.  An examination of the chronological order highlights 
how quickly the Korean government decided.  On September 4, soon after the 
announcement of the results of the vote for independence for East Timor from Indonesia, 
the pro-Jakarta militia began assaults on the Timorese. At that time, the U.N. unofficially 
sent a letter to ask South Korea to dispatch the PKO to resolve the ongoing turmoil. 
However, since the U.N. request, the crisis was not covered by the media and did not 
receive much attention from the public or the Korean government.  
During the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, which was 
held in Auckland, New Zealand on September 12, the South Korean president, Dae Jung 
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Kim, expressed the need for international help in East Timor’s struggle to form a 
democratic state. Furthermore, President Kim mentioned that the Korean government 
would contribute in some ways to help East Timor.  The U.N. Security Council, on 
September 16, passed a resolution to send U.N. PKO troops to East Timor. At that time, 
the U.N. officially requested that the South Korean government dispatch troops as part 
of the U.N. multi-national force.  
Soon, the Korean National Security Council decided to send troops to try and 
help pacify the chaos in East Timor. On September 21, this was confirmed as an official 
government position through a central government meeting.  The same day, the Korean 
government submitted the proposal for conformation to the National Congress.  It took 
only three business days from the time the U.N. officially asked South Korea to dispatch 
troops to East Timor until the decision was made. However, the approval of the National 
Congress was still required.   
The opposition party criticized the move to engage troops in East Timor as 
“hasty” (Korea Times September 17, 1999).  It was pointed out by the opposition party 
that the Korean government made the decision with little information. The GNP 
continuously condemned the government for not fully considering all factors or 
acquiring more information. Specifically, the Secretary of the GNP, Representative 
Sunbong Ha, criticized the lack of consideration of all possible outcomes before 
dispatching troops (Donga Ilbo September 14, 1999): “I doubt that the government did 
take into consideration the long term impact of sending troops on the relationship with 
Indonesia.”  It was also pointed out during the first meeting of the diplomacy and foreign 
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trade committee of the National Congress that the bill proposed by the central 
government might not have been completely reviewed. Some lawmakers opposing the 
proposed bill argued that the government had not reviewed the necessary information 
about the ripple effect of sending troops to East Timor (Choi 2003:111). In line with this, 
the opposition party had been opposed to reviewing that bill.  
In response to the claim of little consideration of possible ripple effects, the 
Korean government met with an ambassador of Indonesia in Seoul and also sent a team 
of special envoys to Indonesia to confirm the attitudes of high-ranking Indonesian 
political and military leaders (Donga Ilbo September 21, 1999).  Eventually, due to the 
action of the Korean government, the proposed bill passed the National Congress on 
September 27.  
 
The U.S. Military Involvement in Haiti 1994 
 
Historical Background 
 
Haiti, officially the Republic of Haiti, a former French colony, became the first 
independent black republic in the region when declaring its independence on January 1, 
1804 (Wiarda and Kline 2000). It possesses one-third of the Caribbean island sharing it 
with the Dominican Republic and has a population of 8.5 million people (CIA World 
Fact Book).24  
Throughout the nineteenth century, Haiti was ruled by a series of presidents with 
short tenures. However, political stability became fragile when an enraged crowd killed 
                                                 
24 See CIA World Fact Book.  
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the president, Guillaume Sam, in 1915.  In the midst of this political turmoil, the United 
States invaded Haiti and occupied it. The United States imposed a constitution and 
implemented policies to improve the politics and economy of Haiti.  However, the U.S. 
efforts suffered at the hands of nationalists rebels who waged a strong guerilla war. As a 
result, the U.S. occupation ended in 1934.  
After the United States left Haiti, Duvalier came to power in the country’s first 
universal suffrage election in 1957. He then declared himself president for life. To make 
matters worse, his nineteen-year-old son succeeded him in office in 1971. The son 
governed Haiti until 1986, when anti-government riots broke out throughout the nation 
and deposed him.  After a few years of upheaval, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former 
Catholic priest, was elected as president in 1991. However, Aristide’s presidency was 
terminated by a military coup nine months after his inauguration.  
The overthrow of Aristide’s democratic regime by the military leader, General 
Cedras, led to economic sanctions and the political isolation of Haiti by the international 
community.  It ultimately resulted in a second U.S. military intervention by the Clinton 
administration on September 19, 1994.   
After military leaders took over in 1991, they used violence to maliciously 
oppress political opposition to their military rule. The more the United States and the 
international community criticized the junta’s terrorization of their population, the 
harsher were the policies the military leaders put in place.  Human Rights Watch 
reported that the ruling military groups began to initiate horrifying tactics like raping 
women and burning down entire neighborhoods (New York Times July 6, 1994).  In this 
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terrible situation, Haiti was a land where brutality and hunger reigned. On Monday July 
4, 1994 a boat loaded with 300 refugees capsized about 100 miles northwest of Port-au-
Prince resulting in the drowning of 150 people. On the same day, 3,247 Haitians were 
stopped from entering the United States by Coast Guard cutters.  Such a surge of Haitian 
refuges forced the Clinton administration to look for a policy to restore peace and order 
in Haiti and to stop Haitians from seeking asylum (Washington Post, July 7, 1994).  
 
Exacerbation of the Haitian Crisis  
 
On March 1993, President Clinton met with ousted Haitian president Aristide.  
The Clinton administration attempted to seek an internal political solution to the Haitian 
crisis that could incorporate both Aristide and the military junta into a coalition 
government.  At the same time, the Clinton administration conducted a gradual 
tightening of economic sanctions on Haiti. Specifically, President Clinton announced in 
June 1993, more sanctions that prevented military coup supporters from entering the 
Unites States and froze their assets in America. Simultaneously, the U.N. imposed a 
global oil and arms embargo on Haiti.   
These efforts of the Clinton administration consequently led Aristide and Cedras 
to sign the so-called Governor’s Island Agreement on July3, 1993, which framed an 
outline of redemocratization of Haiti. According to the agreement, the U.S.S. Harlan 
County, with lightly armed U.S. soldiers and twenty-five Canadian military trainers 
aboard, was sent to Port-au-Prince and reached its destination on October 11, 2003. 
However, the ship turned back to homeport after encountering hostile bluffs from 
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Haitian soldiers. Worse, the military junta had failed to meet any of the conditions in the 
Governor’s Island Agreement.  Finally, in April 1994, White House patience was 
exhausted by the ruling military junta’s continuous defiance and provocations.  
On May 2,1994 President Clinton announced a dramatic shift in U.S. policy 
toward Haiti. He stated that “It was time for them to go” referring to the leaders of 
Haiti’s military junta (Washington Post, May 4, 1994). Additionally, President Clinton, 
for the first time, signaled the possibility of the use of force to pressure Haitian military 
leaders relinquish power.  
In May 1994, the Clinton administration also announced changes in the Haitian 
refugee policy: the United States would continue to interdict all Haitian boat people, but 
they would be allowed to apply for political refugee status instead of being automatic 
repatriated. This modification yielded a stunning amount of Haitian boat people fleeing 
their native country. “During the whole of 1993, around 2,000 Haitians put to sea in 
search of asylum in the United States in June 1994 alone, the number jumped to 5,603.” 
(Washington Post, 7 July 1994).  Panama suddenly reneged on its agreement to 
provisionally house 10,000 Haitian refugees. Other Caribbean countries were also 
reluctant to provide help.  The surge of Haitian refugees fully occupied Clinton’s high 
officials and facilitated the discussion of military options. 
The situation in Haiti continued to worsen.  Haitian military rulers forced all 
international human rights monitors out of the country on July 13, 1994. Then, the U.N. 
Security Council approved U.S. military intervention in Haiti at the end of July. The 
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Clinton administration had also permitted a last-ditch CIA attempt to depose the military 
ruling groups, but it failed (Los Angels Times, 16 September 1994). 
Thus, all non-military means had been exhausted. President Clinton approved a 
final version of a military invasion plan at a meeting with his top advisors on August 26 
(New York Times, September 20, 1994). Most high U.S. officials were pessimistic 
concerning the possibility of former President Carter’s last minute negotiations to reach 
an agreement with the ruling junta.  Under the agreement, the U.S. military invasion on 
September 9, 1994 resulted in no hostile resistance from the Haitian armed forces. Also 
the ruling military junta left for exile in Panama on October 1994, and ousted Haitian 
president Aristide came back to his native country and was restored to power.  
 
Concern for Possible Casualties 
 
Whenever the use of force option was on the table, concern over possible 
casualties was always addressed.  Specifically, May 4, 1994, President Clinton for the 
first time stated the possibility of the use of force regarding the Haitian issue 
(Washington Times May 4, 1994).   Thus, whenever the Clinton administration 
considered military intervention, the concern over expected casualties had been 
addressed.  
In general, U.S. officials had been sensitized to potential casualties by the recent 
horrible deaths of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia, during the previous 
year. The Clinton administration seemed to be determined to not repeat the experience of 
Somalia.  Concern over potential casualties also led to a spilt among Clinton’s officials 
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over the use of military intervention to settle the Haitian crisis (New York Times, August 
4, 1994). Defense Secretary Perry firmly opposed to the early use of military force. On 
the other hand, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, the State Department’s chief policy 
maker on Haiti, favored an early military invasion of Haiti.  
Although analysts foresaw considerable human costs because of messy street-to- 
street battles between the United States and Haitian armed forces (Boston Herald, 
August 4, 1994), most U.S. intelligence officials and Pentagon officials expected that an 
U.S.-led invasion would quickly sweep away Haiti’s ill trained and equipped armed 
forces (New York Times May 30, 1994).25  However, U.S. officials argued that American 
armed forces in Haiti would face the more difficult task of stabilizing Haitian society 
after Aristide returned to power. Consequently, this might exact a higher cost in U.S. 
soldiers lives. Thus, “The problem is not getting in but is getting out.” (ibid).  
Only when all other measures had proved to be unsuccessful, did President 
Clinton order military intervention despite expected casualties.  However, U.S. officials 
took several steps to minimize American casualties. First, an overwhelming force of 
20,000 solders, mostly from special operation forces, would be poured into the small 
island nation to enable them to quickly secure most of Haiti without any substantial 
losses. 
Another measure used to hold down risks after the invasion was the Pentagon 
request for rapid transfer of police duties to other agencies.  In line with this concern, the 
                                                 
25 The Haitian armed forces composed of about 7,500 to 7,700 men. Reportedly about half of the force 
stayed in the capital. Additionally, 1,300 police officers are stationed in Port-au- Prince. Ground forces 
have only six American made lightly armored vehicles and four or five 105 –millimeter artillery and 75 
millimeter guns. The Haitian air force consists of two Italian aircraft for training and some cargo planes. 
The navy has only four patrol boats ( New York Times May 30, 1994). 
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Clinton administration attempted to organize multi-national peace-keeping forces to 
share the burden under the U.N. flag. Concerning these efforts, the United States 
consulted with Canada, Argentine and some African nations.   
When Clinton’s top national security advisors met on August4, 1994 (New York 
Times August 4, 1994), Defense Secretary Perry also suggested offering incentives to the 
Haitian junta in order to decrease the probability of casualties.  Talbott, deputy secretary 
of state, argued that offering incentives such as amnesty and comfortable lives in exile 
was morally repugnant. Secretary Perry harshly countered that “it would be immoral for 
the U.S. not to do whatever it could do avoid the deaths of American soldiers and the 
spending of taxpayer’s money.” (Ibid).  In line with this effort to reduce risks, President 
Clinton permitted a sentence to be included in the agreement, led by a former president 
Carter, that promised to grant amnesty to the military junta for the violent repression 
committed against their citizens.  
Possible casualties were a significant factor for the United States when 
considering the use of force in Haiti.  The concern of expected casualties had an impact 
on the configuration of troops. Pouring 20,000 soldiers into a tiny island was designed to 
quickly sweep out ill-equipped and ill-trained Haitian armed forces. However, the 
casualty concern was not enough to change the U.S. military mission itself.  
 
Ambiguity Intolerance 
  
The Clinton administration showed a high level of ambiguity tolerance. This is 
reflected in their patient review of all plausible choices and the gradual increasing 
  
112
 
pressure on the Haitian military leadership.  Specifically, as I presented in an earlier 
section, the Clinton administration had considered every possible option prior to 
choosing the use of force option. In keeping with this pattern, the American government 
took three years to decide to militarily intervene after Haitian president Aristide’s 
overthrow in 1993. In other words, the Clinton administration needed a great deal of 
time to reach the final decision of military intervention in Haiti.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the two cases, the concern over expected casualties was one of the integral 
considerations for both South Korea and the United States when contemplating sending 
troops.  However, its impact was different between the two cases.  
In the South Korean case, sending troops to East Timor, the concern over 
possible casualties influenced the mission of the Korean troops as well as the 
composition of the troops sent. Thus, the Korean ministry of Defense confined the 
mission of Korean troops in East Timor to concentrate on purely humanitarian 
operations. In order to reinforce this intention, the Korean troops took charge of Lautem, 
a region of East Timor, where there would be less opportunity to face anti-independence 
militia and consequently less chance to incur casualties. In addition, the Korean 
government included a combat unit to protect military medics and engineers, the main 
body of the Korean troops, from possible attack by the anti-independence militiamen.   
In the U.S. case, possible casualties were a significant factor when considering 
use of force in Haiti.  The concern over expected casualties had an impact on the 
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organization of troops. Pouring 20,000 soldiers into a tiny land was intended to quickly 
gain military superiority.  However, the United States did not alter the mission of their 
troops in Haiti.  Therefore, I conclude that these cases indirectly indicate that expected 
casualties had more impact in the Korean case than in the U.S. case.  
Regarding ambiguity intolerance, the two cases represented the differing patterns 
well. South Koreans displayed less tolerance for ambiguity in reaching a final decision. 
The Korean government quickly made the decision and it swiftly passed the National 
Congress. In contrast, the Clinton administration took almost two years to handle the 
Haiti case, they tried every possible diplomatic approach before finally resorting to 
military power.  
One could argue that institutional factors matter in these cases. I mentioned 
earlier (on the basis of Moskos 1996) that different military recruiting polices may affect 
the perception of casualties. Naturally, the institutional structures that underlie the 
political processes differ between the two nations. It is possible that the inherent checks 
and balances in the American political system will affect the “speed” of the decision 
process as well as the amount of information that is included in the deliberation process. 
Although I acknowledge the potential of such institutional variables to account for the 
decisions, I use the case study to suggest the plausibility of cultural factors as an 
additional source for explanation.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will review the argument that differing perceptions 
of casualties affect FPDM.  I will present a summary of the methods (experiments and a 
case study) employed in this study.  I will also present a synopsis of the findings from 
Chapters IV- VII.  I conclude with a few theoretical and political implications, 
suggestions, and an outline for future research.  
 
Reviewing the Arguments 
 
No significant criticism has been raised against the argument that casualties 
incurred in interstate militarized conflicts have a critical influence on public support and 
consequently on FPDM.  However, a comprehensive and cross-cultural framework for 
explaining the impact of casualties on FPDM has not been proposed yet.   
Casualties have been treated in various ways: casualties as a cost (Bennett and 
Stam 1996; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995), as representatives of the intensity of 
militarized conflicts,  and as a criterion for the success or failure of conflicts. These 
approaches are similar in that all types of casualties are interpreted in the same way.  
Other studies, on the contrary, indicate that not all kinds of casualties have the 
same impact (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and 
Wilkening 1997). For instance, Mueller (1973) argues that the public becomes 
habituated to casualties as conflict continues. In other words, a small number of 
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casualties in the early stages of a conflict has a significant impact on public opinion, but 
as the conflict continues, it requires a relatively larger number of casualties to have an 
impact on public support. In line with this, Gartner and Segura (1998) contend that 
marginal casualties could explain the fluctuation of public opinion during a war.   
In addition, scholars have not paid substantive attention to the possibility that 
different cultures may have differing levels of sensitivity to human casualties that will 
affect public reactions. Based on this, I employed the two cultural aspects, which are 
expected to affect the perception of casualties and finally FPDM.  Specifically, I looked 
at the two socio-cultural ingredients: “the level of collectivism vs. individualism, and the 
degree of ambiguity intolerance” in the context of two culturally different countries, 
South Korea and the United States. 
 In a collectivistic society, the interest of the group prevails over the interest of 
individuals, while in an individualistic society, the interest of the individual dominates 
the interest of the group (Hofstede 1997:50). In a collectivistic society, then, individuals’ 
sacrifices would be more valuable if done for the sake of the group.  Thus, in a 
collectivistic society, a public is expected to perceive casualties less negatively and are 
more likely to send troops when considering military intervention. In an individualists 
society, individuals prefer to identify themselves based on ‘I’ rather than ‘we.’ They also 
prioritize their personal goals, interests, and values over those of the society to which 
they belong (Triandis 1995; Oyserman et al. 2002).   Consequently, individualism which 
is related to an emphasis on individual’s interests will lead people to view potential 
casualties more negatively.  
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Based on these propositions, I expected that collectivism vs. individualism would 
affect the choice, while ambiguity intolerance would have an impact on the process of 
decision making. The following hypotheses are derived from my propositions:  
 
Ha1: Koreans are more supportive of military deployment than 
Americans.  
 
Ha2: Higher saliency of the crisis will increase public support for 
military deployment.   
 
Ha3: The negative impact of the number of casualties on support for use of force 
is expected to be stronger for American subjects than Korean subjects.  
 
Hb1a [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a stringent threshold]: Relative 
to Americans, Koreans are more likely to review more items, recall more items, 
and spend more time, en route to a  final decision. 
 
Hb1b [Ambiguity intolerance is associated with a lenient threshold]: Relative to 
Koreans, Americans are more likely to review more items, recall  more items, 
and spend more time on items, en route to a final decision. 
 
Hb2: Saliency of the decision will decrease time spent on the decision (urgency) 
while increasing attention to the items that have been reviewed (higher recall).  
 
 
A Summary of the Methods  
 
Existing studies in cross-national studies, anthropology, and sociology suggest 
that Americans and Koreans differ along cultural dimensions, I attempted to reconfirm 
these differences by utilizing two scales (Singelis 1994; Budner 1962).  
For collectivism vs. individualism, I used, the Singelis scale (1994) (see 
Appendix 2).  This scale has two sub-scales for each of the two dimensions: collectivism 
and individualism. To measure ambiguity intolerance, I used a scale (see Appendix 2) 
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(Budner 1962) that contained positive and negative items.  The positive items are geared 
to check ambiguity intolerance, while negative items are designed to measure ambiguity 
tolerance.  
In order to answer the main research questions, I developed two cross-cultural 
experiments that were built around either a humanitarian or a security issue.   Three 
levels of possible casualties were presented in each experiment.  
Experiment 1 focused on the humanitarian issue. The hypothetical scenario 
described a case where the American and Korean Red Cross were participating in a 
humanitarian response in an African country whose citizens were suffering from a 
relentless civil war. Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of the first experiment, 
but it moved the decision task to a security context. A failed state that supported 
international terrorism had illegally invaded a neighboring country in order to possess a 
natural uranium field. International terror organizations, who had bombed Americans 
(Koreans), were suspected of being associated with the failed state. In the course of 
working to cope with the illegitimate attack, the U.N. urged America (S. Korea) to send 
troops to join the international force.  
I predicted that these experimental results would show differing perceptions of 
casualties based on whether participants were exposed to the humanitarian fictions crisis 
or the security issue. Additionally, I expected Americans and Koreans subjects to 
perceive casualties differently.  
I used Korean students, military officers, and American students as subjects for 
my experiments. However, I do not claim that Texas A&M University undergraduate 
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students, typically more conservative than those of American students from other 
locations, are fully representative of general American students. Nevertheless, if my 
theory is correct, the tests should support my hypotheses even with these participants.  
A case study was developed to support the two principal findings of the 
experiments. I wanted to find historical evidence of the influence of possible casualties 
on decisions made by South Koreans and Americans about whether or not to involve 
troops in a conflict. I selected two humanitarian military interventions for analysis, one 
each by America and South Korea.  To explore the Korean perspective, I examined the 
decision to send troops to East Timor in September 1999, as requested by the U.N.  The 
U.S. involvement in Haiti September 1994 is examined for the U.S. case.  
 
Summaries of the Findings of Chapters IV, V, VI, VII 
 
Chapter IV presents the empirical findings that clarify the different levels of 
collectivism vs. individualism and ambiguity intolerance in the two target nations. As 
expected, the Korean students are more collectivistic than American students, less 
individualistic than American students, and less tolerant to ambiguity than American 
students. Thus, analyses in the experiment focuses on American students and Korean 
students. The different results obtained from the Korean military officers and Korean 
student participants may be caused by their differing ages and experience levels. It is 
plausible that additional analysis on the Korean military and students need to be 
implemented later, but this study focused mainly on the comparison of American and 
Korean students.  
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Chapter V offers several findings of experiment 1, the humanitarian context. The 
Korean students were shown to be more sensitive to variations in casualties and to 
casualties in general. However, salience had no significant impact on the choice. 
Moreover collectivism, a factor that should have affected the value of casualties, did not 
work. Furthermore, there was no interaction effect between group and salience.  The 
treatment of salience did not affect on the choice but had an impact on the process of 
decision making.  
The results do not support the hypothesis (Ha1) that Korean students, who are 
more collectivistic and less individualistic, are less sensitive to potential casualties, and 
more likely than American students to support the use of force.  The empirical evidence 
shows that Koreans are more sensitive to expected casualties, and consequently less 
supportive of the use of force than American students.  
Concerning the justification of the empirical results of choice participants made, 
I propose two alternate accounts. One is associated with a propensity of collectivism in 
the Korean culture as pointed out by Kunda (1999). I have initially proposed that 
collectivism vs. individualism has an impact on the evaluation of costs (i.e. expected 
casualties). In other words, a collectivistic society (i.e. South Korea) puts less negative 
value on casualties than an individualistic society. However, when we focus on a cost-
benefit analysis we need to recognize that support for sending troops is also a function of 
the benefits of the intervention. We need to recognize that support for sending troops is a 
function of the costs and benefits of the intervention.  
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In the humanitarian context, it seems that the collectivist orientation of the 
Koreans reflect a narrow in-group. Koreans may be less sensitive to the perils of the 
victims of the humanitarian crisis than the Americans. In other words, although Korean 
students and American students perceive the same costs (same number of expected 
casualties in the experiment), the perception of benefits from it differs. Therefore, 
Korean students and American students show different levels of support for sending 
troops because of the different anticipated benefits resulting from the military 
intervention.  
This argument leads us to conduct a security-oriented experiment that offers as 
similar benefits as possible for both Korean students and American students. An 
experiment that involves security issues would be suitable for this argument. Korean 
students and American students may expect rather similar benefits from a military 
intervention associated with a security issue than from a military intervention associated 
with a humanitarian issue.   
Another explanation is Muller’s (1973) argument of habituation to casualties. 
Particularly, he argues that since the public becomes habituated to casualties, public 
support is more impacted by casualties incurred in the early stage of a conflict rather 
than those suffered in the later stages. In adapting Muller’s theory, I posit that 
Americans who have numerous previous cases of military intervention and have 
perceived many casualties over time have thus become less attentive to expected 
casualties. In addition, when considering the current deaths incurred from the War in 
Iraq, the argument of habituation makes sense.  
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 However, in Korea, where cases of military intervention and casualties are rare, 
the population is more sensitive to expected casualties. As a matter of fact, the death of a 
Korean enlisted man as a result of the suicide bombing intended to kill Vice President 
Cheney in Afghanistan in March 2007, was the first Korean armed forces casualty in a 
military intervention since the Vietnam War, where 4,770 Korean soldiers died.   
  With respect to the process of decision making, the results of the experiment 
support my propositions that American students are more patient in the face of 
ambiguity than Koreans. Correspondingly, American students need more information 
and time to reach a final choice. As Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) argue, intolerance of 
ambiguity lowers the threshold of decision making.  Accordingly, Korean students had a 
lower threshold and needed fewer items of information. In accordance with number of 
items reviewed, Korean students recalled fewer items than American students did. The 
ratio of recalled items from the items reviewed is smaller for Korean students than for 
American students. This indicates that Korean students paid less attention to the 
information provided than American students.  
The findings of Chapter VI, the experiment associated with the security threat, 
are consistent with the ones of Chapter V, the humanitarian response. In summary, 
Korean students were more sensitive to variations in casualties. However, salience had 
no significant impact on choice. The cultural factors of collectivism and individualism 
had no overall effect on the choices made. With regard to the decision process, 
intolerance of ambiguity lowered the threshold of decision making and expedited the 
process in general.  Higher salience seemed to lower the threshold and require fewer 
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items of information than low salience. Casualties did not have a significant impact on 
the decision process in comparison between American and Korean students. However, it 
had a significant impact on the process when comparing Korean students and Korean 
military officers only.  
Korean students and American students differ in dealing with salience. For 
American students, high salience decreases the number of items reviewed but they retain 
the same attention to items across salience. On the other hand, for Koreans, salience does 
not affect the number of items reviewed, but has an impact on attention paid in 
reviewing items.  
The case study also show support for the main findings of the two experiments. 
Of course, the concern over expected casualties is a significant factor for both South 
Korea and the United States when pondering military interventions. However, the role 
that this concern played in the eventual decision was somewhat different between the 
two cases.  
In the South Korean decision to send troops to East Timor, the concern over 
possible casualties was at the center of the opposition party. The concern over possible 
casualties also affected the configuration and the mission of the troops. The Korean 
government strictly limited the mission of the troops to purely humanitarian operations. 
Then, at the operational level, the dispatched Korean troops were careful to choose an 
area of responsibility where they had the least chance to face the militia, eventually to 
reduce any possibility of incurring casualties. Additionally, the combat units with the 
deployed force were included to protect the medics and engineers, the main body of the 
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troops. In the end, there were indeed no Korean combat deaths in the East Timor 
operation. 
Potential casualties were also a significant consideration when the United States 
was considering military intervention in Haiti. One result was the size of the military 
deployment to reduce U.S. fatalities as much as possible. However, in their case, the 
concern over potential casualties did not alter the mission of the troops. 
The two cases were also different in terms of their decision processes. The South 
Korean government was relatively quick in making a final decision and did not need all 
acquirable information. In contrast, the U.S. government took almost two years to deal 
with the Haitian crisis. They preceded step by step gradually increasing the levels of 
pressure and seemingly exploring every available piece of information about alternatives 
in the case.  
Overall, the main question of this study has been whether potential casualties to 
be incurred during military interventions are perceived in different ways in culturally 
differing societies. Subsequently, I also asked what were the specific impacts of culture 
and their mechanisms to affect decision making.  
Regarding the decision choice, I found that the expected number of casualties 
was considered in different ways between the American and the Korean students. The 
Korean students perceived the expected number of casualties more negatively than the 
American students. This was different from my expectation that the Korean students 
would be more collectivistic and less individualistic, and so show decreased sensitivity 
to the expected number of casualties and more likely to send troops abroad.  
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With regards to process of decision making, the empirical results support the 
hypotheses that the different levels of intolerance of ambiguity, a cultural factor, will 
have an impact on the decision process. Specifically, the Korean students, who are less 
tolerant of ambiguity, needed less information to reach a final decision than did 
American students. Salience also affects the decision process. Higher salience seemed to 
lower the threshold and require fewer items of information than low salience.  
Cultural accounts is a feasible explanation for the different results between 
experiment 1, with its humanitarian context, and experiment 2, set in a security context. 
The different proportions between the humanitarian and security scenarios of 
participants choosing to send troops was greater for the Koreans than for the Americans. 
This can be attributed to the Koreans, who are more collectivistic than Americans, 
setting a narrower in-group definition and thus being less concerned about others’ 
problems and welfare. Continuing this logic, it should be expected that the humanitarian-
oriented crisis did not draw as much attention from Korean participants as the security-
oriented one. This was indeed the case, showing the different preferences in making the 
decision to send troops in the two experiments.  
On the other hand, American students, being less collectivistic, consequently 
formed a larger in-group definition than the Koreans, displaying more concern about 
others’ interests and welfare. Hence, American participants showed almost identical 
preferences toward choosing to send troops across the two experiments.  
Overall, although the results did not completely support cultural accounts, 
cultural explanations have proven to be a viable ingredient in explaining the different 
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observed patterns of foreign policy decision making. Specifically, a cultural factor, 
ambiguity intolerance, had an impact on the process rather than the choice.   
 
Comparing the Results of the Two Different Experiments  
 
I used two different contexts for the experiments: humanitarian issue oriented 
and security issue oriented. These two different contexts impacted both choice and the 
decision process.  
Regarding choice, Korean subjects showed a far greater likelihood of choosing to 
send troops in the security threat context than in the humanitarian situation. The 
proportions of American students choosing to send troops were almost the same in the 
two cases. I suggest that collectivism offers a reasonable explanation for this difference 
by using Kunda’s (1999) argument. This author contends that the definition of the in-
group is narrower in a collectivistic society than in a less collectivistic one, thus 
individuals in collectivism are less concerned about others’ welfare than themselves.  
By this logic, Korean subjects, who are more collectivistic, define the size of 
their in-group as smaller than American participants, who are less collectivistic. Thus, 
Korean participants are less concerned with others’ issues than American students.  In 
other words, Korean subjects were less interested in the humanitarian oriented crisis than 
in the security oriented crisis, because the humanitarian issue may be located beyond the 
Koreans’ defined boundary of in-group. Therefore, the difference between the mean 
ratings of sending troops in the humanitarian case and in the security threat case is 
greater with Korean students than with American students.  
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Casualties and salience are perceived in different ways across the two 
experimental contexts.  These two are considered more seriously in the humanitarian 
context than in the security context.  Specifically, the results of the experiments show 
that the level of expected casualties and the salience have some statistically significant 
effects on the dependent variables. It is reasonable that participants become more 
deterministic in the security scenario than in the humanitarian one, regardless of its costs. 
Therefore, casualties and salience show themselves to be less important in the decision 
calculus arising from the security context.  
 In addition, casualties were more carefully considered by Korean subjects in 
general than by American subjects.  Specifically, casualties had a statistically significant 
impact on the choice only when comparing Korean military vs. Korean students in the 
humanitarian issue. In other words, the more casualties involved, the less likely are 
Korean subjects to choose to send troops.  
 I argue that the security scenario made participants more solid and firm in 
making a decision than the humanitarian scenario. This was the case because participants 
lowered their decision threshold in the security scenario, resulting in their need of fewer 
items of information.  
 
Theoretical and Political Implications 
 
This study bears some theoretical implications as well as political implications. 
The results of this study clarify that culture matters in foreign policy decision making. 
Although the direction of the predicted effects of the cultural factors on choice in this 
  
127
 
study is not confirmed, the findings support the predictions concerning process.  The 
perception of casualties was different in the two cultural settings. This supports the claim 
that culture represents knowledge, beliefs, and values that are expected to affect 
perception, interpretation and reactions to environments and situations. 
Another theoretical implication is associated with costs and benefits decision 
calculus. The findings from the two experiments show that while the American students 
are more supportive of the military intervention than the Korean students, the anticipated 
costs of the military deployment (i.e., anticipated casualties) had no significant effect on 
the choice. Furthermore, the expectation that the “individualistic” Americans will be 
more sensitive to the cost (i.e., casualties) than the “collectivists” Korean did not hold. It 
is plausible that rather than focusing only on the cost element in a cost-benefit analysis, 
our results suggest that the support for sending the troops is a function of the benefits of 
the intervention. Correspondingly, Koreans subjects are more supportive of the use of 
force with a security issue than a humanitarian issue because Korean subjects expect 
more benefits from security oriented military intervention than from humanitarian 
oriented intervention.  
Although I concentrated on culture in this study, I presented some institutional 
factors that may play a role in perceiving expected casualties. First, the different military 
recruiting systems between South Korea and the United States have an impact on the 
perception of expected casualties. Secondly, the different levels of checks and balances 
in the two political systems may play a role. In addition, the American public may play a 
more important role in supporting foreign policy than the Korean public. Third, the 
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legitimacy of sending forces to intervene in foreign conflicts differs in the two societies 
and may influence different levels of support for military intervention.   
This study expands the applicability of the CC model. In Chapter V, since we 
assumed that for Korean students the casualty information (items) had more impact than 
for American students, and since it is a negative and first item, Korean students who 
selected to send troops needed more information than those who selected not to send 
troops. Those who chose not to send troops made their decision on the basis of negative 
items unlike those who chose to send troops.  Specifically, all participants began the 
decision process with negative information, the first item of information to be seen was 
the expected number of casualties, then participants who chose to send troops had a 
greater distance from the threshold than those who chose not to send troops. 
Consequently, under these conditions, the Cognitive Calculus model requires more 
information support the sending of troops choice than in the decision to not send troops. 
Empirical evidence supports the prediction that participants selecting to send troops 
needed more information to reach the decision threshold than did the participants 
choosing not to send troops.  So it expands the applicability of the Cognitive Calculus 
decision model.  
The political implication of this study is practical. If more collectivistic societies 
are less interested in international humanitarian interventions, then those planning such 
operations should expect it to be more difficult to draw participation from nations with 
this type of cultural characteristic. Further, some countries may perceive, interpret, and 
react differently to the same international issue because of their cultures. Thus, when 
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making foreign policy decisions, states should take into account the target nation’s 
cultural characteristics and their likely impact on the issues.  
 
Outline for Future Research 
 
There are a few topics associated with this study appropriate for future research. 
First, I believe valuable findings would be discovered from comparing Korean students 
and Korean military officers. As I discussed, although some findings are similar for the 
two groups, a few different propensities from the two Korean groups were found.   
Secondly, I would like to study political institutions in light of their interaction 
with culture. Specifically, would my findings be replicated if conducted in an 
individualistic nation in Europe?   As a matter of fact, some European states were 
reluctant to send troops to Iraq as they were requested by the United States.  This 
probably was related to the legitimacy of foreign military intervention. So, I expect that 
employing interactive variables of cultural and institutional ingredients enhance 
understanding of the puzzle of public reactions to anticipated casualties.   
The third future research topic would be to conduct experiments with American 
military groups. If so, it would be a balanced comparison of the groups: Korean students 
vs. American students and Korean military vs. American military. We could then 
possibly identify the different perceptions of casualties.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Information Sets 
 
Information set: American participant in Security issue 
 
Following each item is its classification: Pro use of force=PF; Against use of force= AF; 
Neutral= NE. 
 
 
1. [AF] The secretary of defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff predict 
that the U.S. expected casualties in this operation will be 5, 50, 200.  
 
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Americans believe that 
the U.S.  should use of force against Chagola.  
 
3. [AF] An intelligence analyst believes that China may use any military 
interruption by the US against Chagola as an excuse to attack Taiwan, thereby 
instigating a wider regional conflict 
 
4. [PF] Some political advisors believe the use of force will be supported in 
Congress. 
 
5. [NE] Japan and the U.S. have established a new research and development fund 
for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific. 
 
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that taking  the uranium mines out of 
the hands of rouge states  is the “most urgent task” facing America.  
 
7. [AF] Organization of Southeast Asian states opposes the use of force resolution 
by U.N. 
 
8. [PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN 
coalition force if the U.S. decides to send troops.  
 
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the US uses force against Chagola. This 
will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.  
 
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would not be effective.  
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11. [PF] The Joint Chief of Staff considers that the increase in the activity of 
Chagolian ground forces suggests that Chagola might advance to conquer more 
cities in Sagonia.  
 
12. [NE] Mexican police arrested 42 current and former government employees 
involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in 
Mexico. 
 
13.[PF] Several neighboring countries have experienced conflicts with Chagola have 
expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. forces 
to use their airspace. 
 
14. [PF] Chagola’s National Radio Broadcast calls the U.S. “malicious tyranny of 
modern imperialism.” 
 
 15. [AF] Chagola trades with many other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would expect to be effective. Several analysts were against multi-national forces 
because eventually U.S. is paying the major price.  
 
16. [PF] The Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA report that new evidence 
suggests that Chagola may be linked to terrorist groups which have claimed 
responsibility for embassy bombings in the past several years.  
 
17. [PF] Some major news paper’s editorials express public support of use of force 
against Chagola.  
 
18. [PF] A high U.N. official said that  “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and 
the Chagola regime have failed.   
 
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that using force could destabilize the 
region and will result in another Vietnam-like quagmire.  
 
20. [PF] CIA interpreted reliable information that Chagloian government have 
contacted several states in the Middle East who are eager to acquire nuclear 
capability.  
 
 
Information set: American participant in Humanitarian issue 
 
1. [AF] The sectary of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military 
operation will be around a couple of 5, 50, 200.  
 
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Americans believe that 
the U.S.  should send troops to the region.   
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3. [AF] Editorials in various newspapers are criticizing the administration for 
inflated military spending. 
 
4. [PF] Some political advisors expect that sending force will be supported in 
Congress. 
 
5. [NE] Japan and the U.S. have established a new research and development fund 
for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific. 
 
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that to make the region more peaceful is 
the “most urgent task” in Africa.  
 
7. [AF] association of African Americans in the U.S. opposes sending troops to the 
region. 
 
8.[PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN 
coalition force if the U.S. decides to send troops.  
 
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the US sends troops against Chagola. 
This will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens. 
 
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would not be effective.  
 
11. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola 
have expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the 
U.N. forces to use their airspace. 
 
12. [NE] Mexican police arrested 42 current and former government employees 
involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in 
Mexico. 
 
13. [PF] Chogola’s National Radio Broadcast calls the UN “the puppet of malicious 
strong powers” 
  
14. [PF] The Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA report that new evidence 
suggests that Chagola may be linked to a few internationally notorious terrorist 
groups. 
 
15. [AF] Some terrorists organization harbored in Chagola have promised to attack 
American if the U.S. joins the UN coalition force. 
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16. [PF] Chagola is the top five countries who are the worst human rights records of 
this year by Amnesty International.   
 
17. [PF] A high U.N. official said that  “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and 
the Chagola regime have failed.   
 
18. [PF] The Association of African Americans in America urges the federal 
government to do something in responding to the on going genocide in the 
region.  
 
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that sending force could destabilize the 
region and further result in more severe civil war among the factions in Chagola.  
 
20. [PF] Some major news papers expect that the opposition party will also support  
sending the troops.  
 
 
Information set: Korean participant in Security issue 
 
Following each item is its classification: Pro use of force=PF; Against use of force= AF; 
Neutral= NE. 
 
1. [AF] The secretary of defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff predict 
that the Korea expected casualties in this operation will be 5, 50, 200.   
 
2. [PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Koreans believe that the 
Korea  should send troops against Chagola.. 
 
3.  [AF] An intelligence analyst believes that China may use any military 
intervention by the US against Chagola as an excuse to attack Taiwan, thereby 
instigating a wider regional conflict. 
 
4. [PF] Some political advisors believe the use of force will  be supported in Congress. 
 
5. [NE] Japan and Korea have established a new research and development fund for 
Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific. 
 
 6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that Korea has to help to stop selling 
uranium to rouge states. 
  
7. [AF] Organization of Southeast Asian states opposes the use of force resolution by 
U.N. 
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8. [PF] Britain, Canada, China , Japan, and the U.S. have decided to join the UN 
coalition force. 
 
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if Korea uses force against Chagola. This 
will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.  
 
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would not be effective.  
 
11. [PF] The Joint Chief of Staff considers that the increase in the activity of 
Chagolian ground forces suggests that Chagola might advance to conquer more 
cities in Sagonia.  
 
12. [NE] Chinese police arrested 42 current and former government employees 
involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in Mexico. 
 
13. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola 
expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. 
forces to use their airspace. 
 
14. [PF] Chagola’s National Radio Broadcast calls Korea “malicious modern 
economic imperialist ” 
 
15. [AF] Chagola trades with many other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would expect to be effective. Several analysts were against multi-national forces 
because eventually Korea is paying the major price.  
 
16. [PF] CIA reports that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to 
terrorist groups which have claimed responsibility for embassy bombings in the 
past several years.  
 
17. [PF] Some major news paper’s editorials express public support of use of force 
against Chagola.  
 
18. [PF] A high U.N. official said that  “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and 
the Chagola regime have failed.   
 
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that using force could destabilize the 
region and will result in another Vietanm-like quagmire.  
 
20. [PF] CIA interpreted reliable information that Chagolian government have 
contacted a couple of states in the Middle East who are eager to acquire nuclear 
capability.  
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Information set: Korean participant in Humanitarian issue 
 
 
1.[AF] The ministry of defense predicts that the expected casualties for this military 
operation will be around a couple of 5, 50, 200.  
 
2.[PF] A recent national survey indicates that over 80% of Koreans believe that 
Korea should send troops to the region.   
 
 
3. [AF] Most editorials in the newspapers analyze that sending troops in Africa 
would not be helpful in enhancing the influence of Korea over the region.  
 
  4. [PF] Some political advisors believe to send force will be supported in Congress. 
 
5. [NE] Japan and the Korea have established a new research and development fund 
for Oceanographic Satellite research in the Pacific. 
 
6. [PF] The National Security Advisor states that to make the region more peaceful is 
the “most urgent task” in Africa.  
 
7. [AF] Association of African Americans in the U.S. opposes sending troops to the 
region. 
 
8. [PF] Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Italy have promised to join the UN 
coalition force.  
 
9. [AF] OPEC threatens an oil embargo if the Korea sends troops against Chagola. It 
will make the price of gas unbearable to many citizens.  
 
10. [PF] Chagola trades with only few other states, thereby the economic sanctions 
would not be effective.  
 
11. [PF] Several neighboring countries that have experienced conflicts with Chagola 
have expressed a willingness to assist the U.N. coalition force by allowing the U.N. 
forces to use their airspace. 
 
12. [NE] Chinese police arrested 42 current and former government employees 
involved in one of the largest migrant-trafficking rings ever uncovered in China. 
 
13. [PF] Chagola’s National Radio Broadcast calls the UN “the puppet of malicious 
strong powers” 
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14. [PF] CIA reports that new evidence suggests that Chagola may be linked to a few 
internationally notorious terrorist groups. 
 
15. [AF] Some terrorists organization harbored in Chagola have promised to attack 
Koreans if Korea joins the UN coalition force.    
 
16. [PF] Chagola is the top five countries who are the worst human rights records of 
this year by Amnesty International.   
 
17. [PF] A high U.N. official said that  “Backdoor” negotiations between U.N. and 
the Chagola regime have failed.   
 
18. [PF] The Association of African Americans in America urges the federal 
government to do something in responding to the on going genocide in the region.  
 
19. [AF] A specialists of the area concerns that sending force could destabilize the 
region and further result in more severe civil war among the factions in Chagola.  
 
20. [PF] Some major newspapers expect that the opposition party will also support 
sending the troops 
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Appendix 2: The questionnaires  
 
 
1.  Questions about the experiment 
 
Date : _______ 
날짜: 
 
Experimental ID:________(From the screen)  
 
 
Experimental ID: ________(화면에 있는 번호를 적으십시요)  
 
What option did you choose (mark one): Send troops  
귀하의 선택은?  해외파병에 동의함. 
                              해외파병에 반대함 
 
 Sending troops:___ 
         Not sending troops:____ 
 
 
 
How confident are you with your choice? (circle a number) 
 Low confidence  0  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 High confidence 
 
당신은 위에서 당신이 결정한것에 대하여 얼마나 신뢰하는가? 
 
신뢰못함 0  1   2   3   4   5   6    7    8    9  10 강하게 신뢰함. 
 
In general, how relevant were the items of information? 
 Low relevance  0  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 High relevance 
 
귀하는 의사결정을 위해서 몇건의 주어진 정보들을 확인했습니다.  그러면  
주어진 정보들이 해외파병 관련 의사결정과 얼마나 연관성이 있었습니까? 
 
거의 관련없었음 0  1   2  3  4   5  6  7  8   9  10   아주 연관 깊었음 
 
 
 
In this page you are asked to fill in the capital city of each of the countries listed below. 
Note, the two first capitals were already inserted as an example.  
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주어진 국가들의 수도 이름을 아는대로 적으시오.  
 
예) 미국 워싱턴 디시 
예)아르헨티나 브에노스 아이레스 
앙골라  
오스트리아  
벨기에  
볼리비아  
브라질  
불가리아  
캐나다  
칠레  
코스타리카  
쿠바  
이집트  
잉글랜드  
프랑스  
그리이스  
인디아  
이란  
이스라엘  
이탈리아  
일본  
요르단  
케냐  
레바논  
멕시코  
필리핀  
폴란드  
러시아  
스페인  
터어키  
자이레  
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다음의 빈칸에 귀하가 읽은 정보들을 최대한 기억나는대로 적으십시요. 3분간 
동안만 적어주시고 정보들을 읽은 순서와는 상관없이 한 정보당 한 블럭을 
사용하여 적어주세요.  
Following the initial scenario, you have reviewed different items of information. In the 
next three minutes try to recall as many of the items you have seen. The order in which 
you recall the items is not important. Write each item on a separate block of lines.  
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
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_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
 
 
2. The questionnaire for individualism vs. collectivism 
2. 개인주의와 집단주의에 관한 설문조사 
 
The aim of these study is to find out what matters are important or unimportant to 
people. You will find below a 40 items. Please indicate how much agree to you is each 
of the 40 items. 
  
151
 
 
 
To express your opinions, imagines an Agree scale that varies from 1 to a maximum of 
9.  (1) stands for “not agree at all”, and (9) stands for “complete agree”. In other words, 
the larger number, the greater will be degree you agree. Give one number (either 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) to each item below.  
다음의 40 문항의 질문들은 귀하가 어떤것을 중요시여기고 그렇지 않은가에 대한 
설문조사 문항들입니다. 여기서 숫자 “1”의 의미는 중요하지 않다 또는 그렇게 
생각하지 않는다, 전혀 동의 하지 않는다의 의미이고 숫자 “9”의 의미는 아주 
중요하다, 강하게 그렇게 생각한다, 확실히 동의한다는 의미입니다.  
 
 
Items for collectivism 
 
1. I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는  선배님들이나 교수님들을 존경한다. 
전혀 동의하지 않는다.[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 확실히 동의한다.  
 
 
2. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
내가 소속된 그룹의  사람들과 조화를 이루는것이 중요하다.  
 
 
3. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나의 행복은 나의 주위사람들과 밀접한 관계가 있다.  
 
 
4. I would offer my seat in a but to my professor 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 버스에서 나의 지도 교수님께 자리를 양보하겠다.  
 
 
5. I respect people who are modest about themselves 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 겸손한 사람들을 존경한다.  
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6. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 내가 속해 있는 조직이나 단체의 이익을 위해서 나의 개인적인 이익을 
희생할 수 있다.  
 
 
7. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
my own accomplishments. 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 가끔 다른 사람들과의 관계가 내 개인적인 성취보다도 중요하다고 
생각한다. 
 
8. I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making 
education/career plans 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
나는 진로 선택시 부모님의 의견을 존중해야 한다. 
 
 
9. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
내가 속한 그룹의 의사결정을 존중하는 것이 나에게 있어서 중요하다.  
 
10. I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
비록 내가 속한 단체가 별로 맘에 안들지만,  그 단체가  나를 필요로 한다면  
계속 남겠다.  
 
11. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
만약 가족이 어떤 일에 실패할 경우 나는 어떤 책임감을 느낀다.  
 
12. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
 내가 속한 그룹 사람들과 완전히 의견이 불일치 할지라도 나는 그 사람들과  
언쟁을 피한다. 
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Items for individualism  
 
13. I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood. 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
나는 오해를 살 위험이 있는 경우는 과감히 “아니오”라고 말하겠다.  
 
14. Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
수업시간에 자신의 의견을 강하게 주장하는것은 나에게는 전혀 문제가 
안된다.  
 
15. Having a lively imagination is important to me 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
마음껏 상상의 나래를 펼치는 것은 내게 중요하다.  
 
16. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는  많은 사람들 앞에서 칭찬이나 상을 받는 것이 별로 불편하지 않다.  
 
17. I am the same person at home that I am at school 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
나는 학교에서나 집에서나 항상 동일한 사람이다.  
 
18. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
나 자신의 문제부터 처리하는 것이 가장 시급하다.  
 
19. I act the same way no matter who I am with 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 같이 있는 상대가 누구냐에 관계없이 항상 동일하게 행동하려한다.  
 
20. I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after meet them, even when 
they are much older than I am   
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 나보다 연장자를 처음 만났을 때라도 그사람의 이름을 부르는것이 
마음편하다.  
 
21. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
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나는 방금소개 받은 사람과 직설적이고 확실하게 이야기 하는 것을 
좋아한다.  
 
22. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
      나는 많은 점에서다른사람들과 독특하고 다르다는 사실이 기쁘다 
 
23. My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나의 정체성이 다른사람들과 관계없다는 사실이 나에게 매우 중요하다. 
 
24. I value being in good health above everything 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
나는 무엇보다도 건강이 중요하다고 생각한다.  
 
*Selected items are 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23  
 
Singelis, Theodore M. 1994. “The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent 
Self-Construals” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin Vol 20(5): 580-591.  
 
 
 
3. The questionnaire: tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity 
 
 
Positive items 
1. An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know 
too much 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
  
 어떤 전문가가 확실한 해답을 제시하지 못한다면 그는 충분한 지식이 
없는사람이다.  
 
전혀 그렇지 않다.                               확실히 그렇다.  
Tolerance 높음                                      tolerance 낮음 (애매한것은 못참아!) 
 
 
2. There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t be solved 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
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세상에 풀리지 않는 문제는 없다.  
  
3. A good job is one where is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear 
 [   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
쉬운 일거리란  해결방법이 확실한 일거리다.  
  
4. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems 
rather than large and complicated ones. 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 결국에는 크고 복잡한 일을 하는것 보다는 작고 간단한 일을 하는것이 더 
많은 일을 할 수 있는 길이다.  
 
5. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
 항상 해오던것을 하는것이 전혀 낮선것을 하는것보다 좋다.  
 
6. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected 
happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for 
[   1  2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
  
  
 
7. l like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most 
of the people are complete strangers 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 나는 전혀 모르는 사람들과의 모임보다 잘 아는 사람들과의  모임이 더 
편하다.    
 
 
8. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better  
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
  
 우리는 모두 같은 이상과 가치관을  빨리 소유할 수록 더 좋다. 
 
 
Negative items. 
9. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
 나는 외국에서 일정기간 동안 사는것도 좋다고 생각한다.  
전혀 그렇지 않다.                                                         확실히 동의한다. 
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Tolerance 낮음(모르는외국 못참아)                             Tolerance 높음(모르는 
외국도 괜찮아) 
 
10. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 
 항상 시간표와 일정표 맞춰사는 사람은 가끔 삶의 진정한 기쁨을 놓칠 수도 
있다.  
11. It is more fun to tackle to a complicated problem than to solve a simple one 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 간단한 문제를 푸는것보다 복잡하고 어려운 문제를 해결하는 것이 더 
재미있다.  
 
12. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don’t mind 
being different and original 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 다른 새로운 것들을 시도하는 사람들이 가장 멋지고 흥미롭게 보인다.  
  
 
13. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how complicated 
things really are 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 “예” “아니오”라고 단순하고 확실히 대답하기를 좋아하는 사람들은 문제가 
진짜 얼마나 복잡한줄을 모른다.  
 
14. Many of our most important discussions are based upon insufficient information 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 부족한 정보들에 바탕을 두고 우리는 우리삶의 가장 중요한 문제들을 논의 
하곤한다.  
 
15. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a chance for one 
to show initiative and originality 
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
 선생님들은 가끔  학생들의 창의성과 독창성을 확인할 목적으로 
애매모호한 숙제를 내준다.   
 
16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at 
things.  
[   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ] 
  
좋은 선생님이란  당신의 사물을 보는 관점에  대하여 놀라움을  표해주는 
선생님이다.  
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Budner, Stanley. 1962. “ Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable” Journal of 
Personality 30: 29-59.  
 
4. Some information about yourself (for statistical purposes) 
 
 
  
  1..  Are you: 
        귀하의 성별은?    
   1. male (남성) 
   2. female (여성) 
 
 
 
2. How old are you? 
귀하는 나이는 ? 
   1. Under 20(20세 이하) 
   2. 20-24 
   3. 25-29 
   4. 30-34 
   5. 35-39 
   6. 40-49 
   7. 50-59 
   8. 60 or over (60세 이상) 
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